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INTRODUCTION
On the morning of March 28, 2016, several employees of MedStar
Health (“MedStar”), a nonprofit hospital system with ten hospitals in
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Maryland and Washington, D.C.1 were greeted with a pop-up message
stating: “You just have 10 days to send us the Bitcoin . . . [A]fter 10 days
we will remove your private key and it’s impossible to recover your files.”2
The demand was 45 bitcoin,3 which is equivalent to approximately
$19,000.4 If the hospital paid the bitcoin ransom, the hackers claimed they
would provide the necessary information to enable MedStar to regain
access to its system.5 Consistent with recommendations from federal
officials, it appears that MedStar chose not to pay the bitcoin ransom.6
Without its electronic health records (“EHR”) system, MedStar was forced
to shut down its email and computers for all of its ten hospitals and its
approximately 250 outpatient centers.7 The ramifications went beyond
simply shutting down email and computers, however. While the
1. Our Locations, MEDSTAR HEALTH (May 18, 2016), http://www.medstarhealth.org/mhs/ourlocations/#q={}[https://perma.cc/RBG3-9HXL].
2. John Woodrow Cox, MedStar Health Turns Away Patients After Likely Ransomware
Cyberattack, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/medstar-healthturns-away-patients-one-day-after-cyberattack-on-its-computers/2016/03/29/252626ae-f5bc-11e5a3ce-f06b5ba21f33_story.html [https://perma.cc/9GY8-H3YX] (citing to note appearing on computer
screens of employees sent by malware hackers).
3. Id.
4. Bitcoin is an online currency created in 2009, by an individual referred to as Satoshi
Nakamoto, which is thought to be an alias. See Tal Yellin, et al., What is a Bitcoin,
CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/infographic/technology/what-is-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/
8C3M-U4LM]; see also Chad Bray, Australian Ends Attempt to Prove He Founded Bitcoin,
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/06/business/dealbook/
australian-ends-attempt-to-prove-he-founded-bitcoin.html?_r=0 (reporting that the mystery of the
inventor of Bitcoin remains after Craig Steven Wright admitted that he was not, in fact, the inventor,
contrary to his own previous assertions and articles in Wired and Gizmodo in 2015 that identified
Wright as Nakamoto). The intention behind the currency is that the transacting parties can exchange
the currency directly without a bank or any other third party transacting agent (as would be the case
with credit cards, which often have associated credit card fees). Yellin, supra. Bitcoins can be
purchased on a bitcoin exchange, which allows individuals to either buy or sell bitcoin using various
currencies (dollars, euros, pounds, etc.). Id. One of the features of a bitcoin exchange is that the names
of the individual buyers and sellers are not revealed. Rather, the transaction is logged as being between
wallet IDs. Id. This anonymity makes it difficult to ever trace the wallet ID back to the buyer or seller,
and thus, Bitcoin has become a popular vehicle for purchasing drugs or other illicit activities online.
Id.
5. Cox, supra note 2.
6. See Rachael King, FBI Cyber Division Chief Advises Companies Not to Pay Ransom for
Release of Data, WALL ST. J.: CIO J. (May 4, 2016, 1:24 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
cio/2016/05/04/fbi-cyber-division-chief-advises-companies-not-to-pay-ransom-for-release-of-data/
[https://perma.cc/25MY-L4XX]. See Mark Hagland, The Cyberattack on the 10-Hospital MedStar
Health Poses Several Important Questions to Patient Care Leaders, HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS
(Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.healthcare-informatics.com/blogs/mark-hagland/so-it-was-ransomwareimplications-attack-medstar-health [https://perma.cc/NDM8-3F2Z] (“A bitcoin tracking site reports
that no funds have been transferred in or out of [the online ‘wallet’ that MedStar was directed to in
order to pay the ransom demand].”).
7. Cox, supra note 2.

2017]

Send Us the Bitcoin or Patients Will Die

939

emergency department in MedStar’s Washington, D.C. hospital stayed
open during the outage, the challenges with triaging and treating patients
utilizing a back-up paper system eventually led to diversion of patients
with life-threatening conditions to other area hospitals.8 Moreover, many
of MedStar’s outpatient clinics were forced to cancel appointments
entirely, as some were unable to provide treatment or other routine office
management functions, such as check-in, billing, and collection, without
their computer system in operation.9 Beyond the inconveniences of slow
response time and rescheduling of certain outpatient appointments, lack of
access to the EHR system created patient care concerns and potential
safety risks.10 For example, a nurse reported to The Washington Post that,
because of delayed lab results, she continued to give certain medication—
“with a number of potentially serious side effects”—to a patient whose
medication should have been discontinued eight hours earlier.11 While
MedStar executives tried to remain positive to the public, the narratives
from patients, providers, and staff about the challenges presented with this
sort of attack revealed a different story.12
While a malware attack like this may be a mere annoyance or
inconvenience for some businesses, the challenges presented to healthcare
providers in this context can be much more devastating.13 Unfortunately,
stories like that of MedStar are not isolated. Within weeks of the MedStar
attack, there were reports of attacks on one hospital in Kentucky, two
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. (noting that a man receiving cancer treatment was unable to receive radiation treatment
for two days because of the shutdown).
11. Id.
12. Id. (“Without access to email and computer systems, the medical staff fell back on
seldom-used paper records . . . [which] are far less comprehensive than those kept in digital form.
They can be missing vital pieces of patient information . . . .”). See also Jürgen Stausberg, et al.,
Comparing Paper-based with Electronic Paper Records: Lessons Learned during a Study on
Diagnosis and Procedure Codes, 10 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 470 (Sept./Oct. 2003),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC212784/ [https://perma.cc/MT7J-6D6T] (noting that
often times the electronic record contains distinct data and finding that “parallel use of electronic and
paper-based patient records result[ed] in inconsistencies between the record systems’ and
‘documentation [was] missing in both.”).
13. See Naomi Lachance, Malware Attacks on Hospitals Put Patients At Risk, NASHVILLE PUB.
RADIO (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/04/01/472693703/
malware-attacks-on-hospitals-put-patients-at-risk [https://perma.cc/42YJ-VJNR] (quoting Kevin Fu,
Associate Professor at the University of Michigan, “[t]he big difference with health care is that the
consequences are greater . . . . You can lose your email and that’s annoying, but patient records are
needed in order to treat patients.”); Nsikan Akpan, Has Health Care Hacking Become an
Epidemic?, PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar. 23, 2016, 6:19 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/hashealth-care-hacking-become-an-epidemic/ [https://perma.cc/3PK6-W9M3] (noting that there are
fewer protections for health data, but such data is also more valuable because of the amount of
information that is contained in such records).
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hospitals in California, one hospital in Kansas, and one hospital in Ottawa,
Canada.14 Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center in Los Angeles,
California announced that it had paid the 40 bitcoin ransom demand
(equivalent to about $17,000) in order to regain access to its system.15
Kansas Heart Hospital, in Wichita, also paid a bitcoin ransom in an effort
to regain access to its EHR system, but it gained only “partial access” and
a demand for additional money.16 While hackers and data breaches are not
new in the healthcare context,17 ransomware attacks18 are unique in the
way they have a direct and immediate impact on the actual provision of
care to patients and present a very real threat to patient safety.19 Sadly, the
potential devastation that could be caused when hospitals and health
systems lose access to their EHRs and computer systems20 is exactly what
makes these types of attacks so attractive to potential hackers.21 As these
attacks are starting to become more commonplace, many are questioning
how the healthcare industry has become so vulnerable and what can be
14. Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, Ransomware: Time for a HIPAA Update?, INFORISK TODAY
(Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.inforisktoday.com/ransomware-time-for-hipaa-a-9002 [https://perma.cc/
48KQ-RH8Z].
15. Id.; Richard Winton, Hollywood Hospital Pays $17,000 in Bitcoin to Hackers; FBI
Investigating, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2016, 10:44 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/
la-me-ln-hollywood-hospital-bitcoin-20160217-story.html [https://perma.cc/HD2M-QUSH].
16. Justin Pot, Ransomware Attackers Refuse to Decrypt Hospital’s Files After Being Paid Off,
DIGITAL TRENDS (May 24, 2016, 4:43 PM), http://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/ransomwarehospital-hackers-demand-more-money/ [https://perma.cc/GL82-N9BC].
17. See Claire Groden, This Big U.S. Health Insurer Just Got Hacked, FORTUNE (Sept. 10, 2015),
http://fortune.com/2015/09/10/hack-health-insurer-bluecross/ [https://perma.cc/73J8-TZZ2] (noting
that Excellus BlueCross BlueShield announced that more than ten million of its customers’
information—including social security numbers, names, addresses, birthdates, financial information,
and claims—had been exposed in a cyberattack); Kara Scannell & Gina Chon, Cyber Security: Attack
of the Health Hackers, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/f3cbda3e-a027-11e58613-08e211ea5317.html#axzz49JER10mJ [https://perma.cc/7ZBE-PQ5Q] (reporting that hackers
believed to be from China used administrator’s credentials to access health insurer Anthem’s database
to access personal information such as names, social security numbers, and birthdates of over seventyeight million people).
18. Ransomware is a type of malware that blocks users from accessing their data until a ransom
is paid. See Zetter II, infra note 105.
19. Unlike cyberattacks intended to access personal data, a cyberattack that prevents access to
an EHR disrupts the ability of a provider to actually provide care in the same manner. Erin McCann,
Nurses Want Probe into EMR Failure, HEALTHCAREIT NEWS (Mar. 10, 2015, 11:23 AM),
http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/rns-want-investigation-emr-failure [https://perma.cc/6FSMFH2E] (noting all of the issues that arose at Antelope Valley Hospital in Lancaster, California when
its EHR crashed).
20. When referring to an EHR, this Article considers not only the records themselves, but the
“front end” and “back end” system components that permit a provider to schedule patients and also
bill and process claims for services already provided.
21. Andrea Peterson, Why Hackers Are Going After Health-Care Providers, WASH. POST: THE
SWITCH (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/03/28/whyhackers-are-going-after-health-care-providers/ [https://perma.cc/6V6H-4MZX].
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done to stop the cycle of attacks.22 Despite efforts by the United States
Congress to increase reporting of cyberattacks23 and efforts by the
Department of Commerce to increase education and awareness on
cybersecurity,24 more needs to be done in order to prevent these attacks
and provide greater protection not just of patient data but also of the EHRs
and computer systems upon which patients’ lives depend.
Hospitals and health systems appear uniquely vulnerable to
ransomware attacks as a result of various factors, including (1) the
fractured movement toward electronic medical records and (2) the
Department of Health and Human Services’ lack of emphasis on
enforcement of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (HIPAA)25 and the Health Information Technology for Economic
and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act26 with respect to security of electronic
data. This Article argues that, while stricter and more current federal
regulations are necessary, the most expedient way to protect against
immediate attacks will be an industry-driven response demanding
industry-wide security standards from EHR companies above and beyond
HIPAA standards. To accomplish such a response, the healthcare industry
will first have to shift from its current electronic security culture that
contemplates only the minimum necessary for HIPAA compliance and
instead push providers to realize that security of EHRs and patient data
will require time, money, and resources in the same way that providers
have invested in the latest medical equipment, upgraded facilities, and
hired innovative and dynamic personnel in order to compete with one
another. Ideally, this shift will also spur a decrease or consolidation of
EHR products and offerings—especially those products for specific
medical specialties and thus, limited in marketability—into only a few
products that will provide more collaboration, system integration, and
compatibility among systems. Such consolidation will actually drive

22. Id.; Akpan, supra note 13; see also DANIEL W. BERGER, REDSPIN’S BREACH REPORT 2015:
PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION (PHI) 4 (Feb. 2016) (noting that 98.1% of all “records breached
in 2015 were the result of hacking attacks/IT incidents” and that there was an 897% increase in
breached records from 2014 to 2015).
23. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, 6 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1510 (2015).
24. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFF. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, HIPAA SECURITY
RULE CROSSWALK TO NIST CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK, (Feb. 2016), http://www.hhs.gov/
sites/default/files/NIST%20CSF%20to%20HIPAA%20Security%20Rule%20Crosswalk%2002-222016%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/FBU8-LJNJ] [hereinafter CROSSWALK].
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg (2010), 1320d (2010); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181 (2011), 1182 (2008), 1183
(1996).
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300jj to jj-51 (2016), §§ 17901–17903 (2009); Title XIII (Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, “HITECH”) of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (AARA), Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 226-79 (2009) (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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providers closer to the goals envisioned under HIPAA and make security
of those systems easier and more reliable.
Part I of this Article describes how the healthcare industry has arrived
in this place of vulnerability, including (1) the history of the movement
toward EHRs through HIPAA, (2) HIPAA’s meaningful use regulations
and the background of current ransomware attacks, and (3) the distinctions
between these attacks and other security breaches that have plagued large
insurers and health systems within the last five years. Next, Part II will
examine current industry culture when it comes to cybersecurity and
review current legal and business approaches to address this growing
threat. Then, Part III will argue that, while the current laws—including
HIPAA and HITECH—are a good start, they do not go far enough to curb
the current ransomware attacks and thus, should be amended. It will
further argue that such amendments cannot be the only solution. Rather,
the healthcare industry has to spur its own movement toward better and
tighter security over its healthcare technology. Lastly, this Article will
conclude with some suggestions and recommendations for how industry
and government regulators can work together to assure that hospitals and
health systems are not faced with the dilemma of having to choose
between patient safety and the payment of a bitcoin ransom.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Origins of HIPAA and the Emergence of Electronic Medical Records
When HIPAA was first enacted in 1996,27 its objectives were
two-fold: (1) assure that individuals could maintain health insurance
between jobs; and (2) protect the privacy and confidentiality of patient data
as the healthcare industry moved toward electronic transmission of patient
data.28 Although HIPAA was first enacted in 1996, it was not until 2003
that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) first enacted
regulations addressing privacy (known as the “Privacy Rule”)29 and
security of protected health information (known as the “Security Rule”).30
Though HIPAA was intended to move providers toward utilization of
27. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, H.R. 3103, 104th Cong. (1996)
(enacted).
28. Id. Note that the first goal of HIPAA was implemented relatively easily, creating the COBRA
program that enables individuals to maintain coverage for a period of eighteen months following
termination of any job. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 750–51 (7th ed. 2013).
29. The Privacy Rule and Security Rule are combined in the HIPAA Administrative
Simplification Regulations. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160 (2014), 162 (2011), 164 (2013).
30. Id.

2017]

Send Us the Bitcoin or Patients Will Die

943

EHRs,31 at first the law did little to actually change the practices of many
providers to move away from paper records systems.32 As Dr. David
Blumenthal of the U.S. Office of the National Coordinator for Health
Information Technology (ONC) noted in 2010: “We have years of
professional agreement and bipartisan consensus regarding the potential
value of EHRs. Yet we have not moved significantly to extend the
availability of EHRs from a few large institutions to the smaller clinics and
practices where most Americans receive their health care.”33 Indeed, a
report from the ONC found that, by 2008, only 9.4% of hospitals had a
basic EHR system.34 While widely believed to help mend some of the
fragmentation of the current U.S. healthcare system and provide better
patient outcomes through enhanced communication and care coordination,
hospitals and other practitioners were slow to adopt new technology.35
Even acknowledging the benefits, implementation of an EHR system
requires capital investment in new equipment and software, training time
for staff, redesigning of clinical processes and workflow, disruption of
billing and collection, and new compliance requirements.36 Thus,
implementation of an EHR system is neither an easy nor inexpensive
proposition for providers.37 While providers may adjust over time, it has
been reported that EHRs “can potentially decrease individual provider
31. Following the enactment of HIPAA, the George W. Bush Administration began pushing
healthcare providers toward a national EHR, stating in 2004 that it had a ten-year goal that the U.S.
implement a national EHR by 2014. See Nicolas P. Terry, Certification and Meaningful Use:
Reframing Adoption of Electronic Health Records as a Quality Imperative, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV.
43, 48 (2011) (citing White House Off. of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Transforming Health Care for
All Americans (May 27, 2004), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2004/05/20040527-2.html).
32. JAWANNA HENRY ET AL., ADOPTION OF ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD SYSTEMS AMONG
U.S. NON-FEDERAL ACUTE CARE HOSPITALS: 2008-2015, 35 ONC DATA BRIEF 1, (May 2016),
https://dashboard.healthit.gov/evaluations/data-briefs/non-federal-acute-care-hospital-ehr-adoption2008-2015.php [https://perma.cc/ZA52-QTNE].
33. David Blumenthal & Marilyn Tavenner, The “Meaningful Use” Regulation for Electronic
Health Records, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 501, 501 (2010).
34. HENRY ET AL., supra note 32.
35. Id.; Nir Menachemi & Taleah H. Collum, Benefits and Drawbacks of Electronic
Health Record Systems, RISK MGMT. & HEALTHCARE POL’Y 47 (May 11, 2011),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3270933/pdf/rmhp-4-047.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
68WG-LTM9] (noting that electronic health records have the ability to revolutionize the healthcare
industry, but noting the functional, financial, productivity, and privacy and security concerns).
36. Agency for Healthcare Res. & Quality, Electronic Medical Record Systems, HEALTH INFO.
TECH., https://healthit.ahrq.gov/key-topics/electronic-medical-record-systems [https://perma.cc/
S2BJ-XTBM] (citing various barriers to adoption of an EHR, including “[h]igh capital cost and
insufficient return on investment for small practices and safety net providers[, u]nderestimation of the
organizational capabilities and change management required[, and f]ailure to redesign clinical process
and workflow to incorporate the technology systems”).
37. See id.; see also Menachemi & Collum, supra note 35, at 51.
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productivity by 10%” and can add additional costs for maintenance of the
system as well as storage of the data on a long-term basis.38 Knowing that
spurring providers (especially smaller providers) into implementing an
EHR would be a challenge, HHS tried other incentives prior to enactment
of HITECH to push providers toward use of electronic records.39 HHS
created a safe harbor under the federal Anti-kickback Statute and an
exception to the Physician Self-Referral Law (otherwise known as the
Stark Law) that would permit hospitals to provide certain hardware and
software to referring physicians to adopt an EHR system or to enable
physician practices to have e-prescribing capabilities.40 Additional
funding was given to states for the establishment of regional health
information exchanges (RHIOs),41 designed to encourage providers in a
particular region to share medical information in a central location (or
“vault”) enabling other providers to access the data as patients seek care
from various providers in the region.42 Since enactment of HITECH, there
have been additional (albeit distinct) efforts43 toward other medical
38. Dean F. Sittig & Hardeep Singh, Legal, Ethical, and Financial Dilemmas in Electronic
Health Record Adoption and Use, 127 PEDIATRICS e1042, e1045 (Apr. 2011),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3065078/ [https://perma.cc/3ART-QXJU] (noting
further that many providers are concerned about cost, given the ongoing expense, offset by the fact
that an estimated 89% of the monetary benefits of an EHR actually inures to health insurers (or
payors)).
39. Id.
40. See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(x), (y) (2017); 42 C.F.R. § 411.357(v), (w) (2017).
41. The primary goals of RHIOs are to enable better patient care through a reduction in
overtreatment and duplicative care enabled through access to information among providers. Julia
Adler-Milstein et al., The State of Regional Health Information Organizations: Current Activities and
Financing, 27 HEALTH AFFS. 60, 61 (2007), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/27/1/
w60.full.pdf+html [https://perma.cc/J5KA-97BM].
42. 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-31(a)(1) (2009) (directing the Secretary of HHS to invest in infrastructure
necessary to support “health information technology architecture that will support the nationwide
electronic exchange and use of health information in a secure, private, and accurate manner, including
connecting health information exchanges ”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-31(a)(2)–(7) (2009) (HITECH
also provided funding for the Secretary of HHS to support “(2) [d]evelopment and adoption of
appropriate certified electronic health records for categories of health care providers not eligible for
support under title XVIII or XIX of the Social Security Act . . . for the adoption of such records[;] (3)
[t]raining on and dissemination of information on best practices to integrate health information
technology, including electronic health records, into a provider’s delivery of care . . . [;] (4)
[i]nfrastructure and tools for the promotion of telemedicine . . . [;] (6) [p]romotion of technologies and
best practices that enhance the protection of health information by all holders of individually
identifiable health information [; and] (7) [i]mprovement and expansion of the use of health
information technology by public health departments.”).
43. Despite some initial excitement around RHIOs, the majority of the projects have been largely
abandoned due to a variety of factors, including complex and detailed regulations and movement
toward other collaboration and consolidation efforts. See Joshua M. Liao & Danny Chu, The State of
Health Information Exchange, 3 J. HEALTH MED. INFO. 1 (2012), http://www.omicsonline.org/thestate-of-health-information-exchange-2157-7420.1000e102.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BL9-M8JC].
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records integration. The most impactful effort is perhaps the creation of
accountable care organizations (ACOs) under the Affordable Care Act
(ACA), which requires clinical integration that can be accomplished
through coordination and/or consolidation of EHRs.44 None of the efforts,
however, have been able to fulfill HIPAA’s stated goals regarding better
communication among providers. Rather, to date, the principal effort has
been simply moving providers toward adoption of any electronic records
system.45
It was this slow response by providers and seemingly stagnant
approach to EHR adoption that spurred enactment of the HITECH Act in
2009.46 HITECH’s “meaningful use” standards directed hospitals and
other health care providers not only to possess a “certified EHR” system47
but also to “meaningfully use” health information technology.48
Demonstration of “meaningful use” under the regulations requires the
provider to meet “certain measurement thresholds that range from
recording patient information as structured data to exchanging summary
care records.”49 These measurements are established in three different
stages.50 In an effort to assure compliance, HHS utilized funding
appropriated by Congress to enact regulations to encourage and promote

44. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2016); see also Statement
of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the
Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67026, 67027 (Oct. 28, 2011).
45. The first set of regulations for Stage 1 was published in 2010. See 75 Fed. Reg. 44,314 (July
28, 2010).The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has subsequently issued
regulations for Stage 2. See 77 Fed. Reg. 53,968 (Sept. 4, 2012). For Stage 3, see 80 Fed. Reg. 16,732
(Mar. 30, 2015).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300jj to jj-51 (2016).
47. The ONC has officially removed the definition of certified EHR technology from its
definitions, but generally defines it as an EHR that supports the EHR Incentive Programs, as set forth
in the EHR Incentive Programs regulations. See Off. of the Nat’l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech.,
Certified EHR Technology Definition, HEALTHIT.GOV, https://www.healthit.gov/policy-researchersimplementers/certified-ehr-technology-definition [https://perma.cc/D3KY-VEMB].
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300jj to jj-51.
49. Office of the Nat’l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., Meaningful Use
Regulations, HEALTHIT.GOV, https://www.healthit.gov/policy-researchers-implementers/meaningfuluse- regulations [https://perma.cc/Z33K-E9NB].
50. Id. One of the primary goals of the meaningful use requirements was to assure that not only
did providers purchase an EHR but also that they purchase one that is more than simply an electronic
filing system in which all paper records are simply stored online in PDF format. This is evident from
the various stages of the meaningful use regulations. Once providers adopted an EHR under Stage 1,
they move to Stage 2, which “encouraged the use of health IT for continuous quality improvement at
the point of care and the exchange of information in the most structured format possible.” Ctrs. for
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Electronic Health Records (EHR) Incentive Programs, CMS.GOV,
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/index.html?
redirect=/ehrincentiveprograms [https://perma.cc/8SGP-C8H6] (emphasis added).
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adoption of EHRs through a “carrot and stick” approach.51 In doing so,
HHS initially encouraged adoption and use of EHRs through financial
incentives to providers52 but, after four years, began assessing penalties
for any providers who failed to adopt and use EHRs.53
The incentives and penalties seem to have accomplished at least
some of HITECH’s intended goals. By 2015, 96% of all non-federal acute
care hospitals possessed a certified EHR system, with 84% of those
hospitals adopting a basic EHR system.54 While it certainly spurred
providers to finally purchase, and in some cases adopt, an EHR system,55
this rapid ascent into EHR adoption seems to have caused some
unintended consequences.56 As one author has noted,
Unlike other sectors that implemented IT naturally and gradually
over the course of many years, health care went digital overnight,
after the government allocated billions of dollars to promote adoption
of electronic health care records . . . . This explosive growth rate is
alarming and indicates that health care entities could not have the
organizational readiness for adopting information technologies over
such short period of time.57

In addition to challenges with organizational readiness, the almost
instantaneous demand for EHRs, without emphasis or requirement in the
regulations for any compatibility between systems, has resulted in a lack
of interoperability between health information technologies among
providers both regionally and across the country.58 Indeed, initial HITECH
51. Roger Hsieh, Improving HIPAA Enforcement and Protecting Patient Privacy in a Digital
Healthcare Environment, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 175, 181 (2014).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(o) (2016).
53. Samantha Burch, Meaningful Use—Stage 3 Coming, Stages 1 and 2 Compliance, 20150325
AHLA SEMINAR PAPERS 9 (Mar. 25, 2015); American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No.
111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009); 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4.
54. HENRY ET AL., supra note 32. This information is based on non-federal acute care hospitals.
A basic EHR system is defined as a system that has a “minimum use of 10 core functionalities
determined to be essential to an EHR system.” Id. As noted above, a certified EHR is an EHR that has
technology certified to meet federal requirements. The importance of this distinction is that while
nearly 97% of hospitals possessed an EHR that meets minimum requirements under federal
regulations, only about 76% of hospitals had implemented and were using a basic EHR in 2014. Id.
The statistics were largely unchanged for reporting year 2015.
55. While many providers purchased an EHR, not all providers actually began using it or adopted
its use as contemplated by the meaningful use regulations. See Niam Yaraghi, A Health Hack WakeUp Call, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 1, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/
policy-dose/articles/2016-04-01/ransomware-hacks-are-a-hospital-health-it-wake-up-call
[https://perma.cc/66YG-LD8E].
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. George Palma, Electronic Health Records: The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly, BECKER’S
HEALTH IT & CIO REV. (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/healthcare-

2017]

Send Us the Bitcoin or Patients Will Die

947

regulations focused on providers’ use of an electronic system in an attempt
to transition providers away from paper records and also away from
purchasing systems that effectively provided an online electronic record
filing system.59 As Stage 1 focused on getting hospitals to adopt EHRs,
later Stages 2 and 3 of the HITECH program shifted to incorporation of
some health information exchange (such as orders and tests), greater
patient interaction and access to one’s own health system, transitions in
care, decision support, and improving population health outcomes.60
Despite the newfound accessibility the EHR provides, few metrics or
measurements focus on an ability to communicate health information
across various spectrums of care.61 Although there may be additional goals
in the coming years,62 thus far the regulations have not focused on the
coordination of those EHR systems among providers, that is, the ability of
various EHR systems to “talk” to one another.63 Contrary to some of the
information-technology/electronic-health-records-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly.html
[https://perma.cc/RJD6-7E26] (stating that sharing information within networks of referring hospitals
is frequently not possible, as may providers are unwilling to open the lines of communication and little
planning for integration is being put into place).
59. Electronic Health Record Incentive Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 44,314, 44,321 (July 28, 2010).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 44321–22. Stage 1 of the program, effective in 2011, was for the purpose of data capture
and sharing; Stage 2, effective in 2014, was for the purpose of advancing clinical processes, and Stage
3, effective in 2016, was for the purpose of improved outcomes. See Office of the Nat’l Coordinator
for Health Info. Tech., Meaningful Use Definition & Objectives, HEALTHIT.GOV,
https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/meaningful-use-definition-objectives
[https://perma.cc/JLE5-JKFR].
62. It should be acknowledged here that part of the reason that RHIOs and other efforts regarding
interoperability have remained relatively stagnant is the simultaneous efforts under the Affordable
Care Act of 2010 (ACA) to create accountable care organizations (ACOs). See Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2016). ACOs, defined as “groups of doctors and other health
care providers who voluntarily work together with Medicare to give high quality service to Medicare
Fee-for-Service beneficiaries,” contemplate clinical integration in order to meet federal requirements,
including requirements set forth by the Federal Trade Commission, regarding these sorts of activities.
See Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Shared
Savings Program, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-For-ServicePayment/
sharedsavingsprogram/index.html [https://perma.cc/2AWB-GLBE]; State of Antitrust Enforcement
Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings
Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026, 67,027 (Oct. 28, 2011). Because quality metric reporting and clinical
integration typically requires sharing of data, one of the goals of ACOs is to create this interoperability
or data sharing between providers. Thus, as the provisions of the ACA are now being implemented
and ACOs and other initiatives such as value-based purchasing push providers toward integration,
many are waiting to see whether interoperability will come about as a result of these other efforts
toward integration and payment reform. See Joseph Conn, Interoperability Hurdles Impede ACOs,
MOD. HEALTHCARE (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160120/NEWS/
160129991 [https://perma.cc/4RAG-TSRB].
63. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAD-15-817, ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS:
NONFEDERAL EFFORTS TO HELP ACHIEVE HEALTH INFORMATION INTEROPERABILITY,
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672585.pdf [https://perma.cc/F67Y-8MZG] (noting five key
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initial intentions of HIPAA to utilize EHRs for the purpose of sharing data
among providers across the continuum of care, the focus under HITECH
seems to be driven by the goals of compliance and reporting.64
Just as the regulations have not focused on interoperability, there has
been little emphasis on a need to update, revise, or reevaluate the security
regulations drafted under HIPAA.65 Even with enactment of HITECH,
there have been no updates or amendments to the security regulations
issued under HIPAA since it was finalized in 2003.66 Many critics feel that
the security provisions are already many years out of date and, as a
consequence, do little to actually protect data as necessary to account for
the current state of cybersecurity.67 CynergisTek, Inc.68 co-founder and
CEO Mac McMillan has stated,
We’re behind . . . [b]asically what we really need to do is scrap the
HIPAA Security Rule and just let organizations select the framework
that they want to work with, whether it’s [National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST)], whether it’s [International
Organization for Standardization (ISO)], but a legitimate framework.
From there, they build their program and we hold them accountable
for protecting the data. . . . The problem is that HIPAA is
antiquated . . . It’s behind the times and we need to take a new
approach.69
challenges in achieving EHR-interoperability: “(1) insufficiencies in health data standards, (2)
variation in state privacy rules, (3) accurately matching patients’ health records, (4) costs associated
with interoperability, and (5) the need for governance and trust among entities, such as agreements to
facilitate the sharing of information among all participants in an initiative.”); see also Fred Pennic, 4
Challenges of Establishing EHR Interoperability, HIT CONSULTANT (Oct. 2, 2015),
http://hitconsultant.net/2015/10/02/4-challenges-of-establishing-ehr-interoperability/
[https://perma.cc/AG9Q-D9GJ].
64. Hsieh, supra note 51, at 189. It must be acknowledged that there are some provisions under
the HITECH regulations that attempt to address the capabilities of an EHR to communicate
electronically with other electronic systems. For example, HITECH requires that the EHR have the
ability to e-prescribe so that prescriptions can be sent electronically to a pharmacy. 45 C.F.R.
§ 170.314(b)(3) (2016).
65. See Hsieh, supra note 51, at 190.
66. Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards; Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334 (Feb. 20, 2003).
For information regarding any guidance and lack of updates since enactment of the final rule, see
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Office for Civil Rights, The Security Rule, HHS.GOV,
http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/ [https://perma.cc/U8SF-HEAM].
67. Elizabeth Snell, Is the HIPAA Security Rule Doing Enough for Healthcare?,
HEALTHITSECURITY (Apr. 22, 2015), http://healthitsecurity.com/news/is-the-hipaa-security-ruledoing-enough-for-healthcare [https://perma.cc/UVD3-3HEX].
68. Cynergistek, Inc. is a healthcare IT company providing security, privacy, compliance and
audit, and management services for entities in the healthcare industry. See generally CYNERGISTEK,
INC., http://cynergistek.com/ [https://perma.cc/QD42-72C2].
69. See Snell, supra note 67. “NIST” stands for the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, and “ISO” stands for the International Organization for Standardization. Id.
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Although the HIPAA security standards have not been updated since
2003, the government has consistently updated standards from the NIST
with respect to cybersecurity and recently created a “crosswalk”70 between
the NIST guidance and HIPAA security regulations.71 The NIST, now part
of the U.S. Department of Commerce, was founded in 1901 to “remove a
major challenge to U.S. industrial competitiveness at the time—a
second-rate measurement infrastructure that lagged behind the capabilities
of the United Kingdom, Germany, and other economic rivals.”72 Today,
the NIST’s measurements support all sizes and forms of technologies,
including cybersecurity.73 In February of 2014, the NIST released its
Framework for Improving Clinical Infrastructure Cybersecurity pursuant
to an Executive Order.74 The framework was intended “to help
organizations in any industry to understand, communicate, and manage
cybersecurity risks.”75 Because HIPAA has its own set of regulations
regarding security of electronic health information, the goal is to identify
potential gaps between HIPAA regulations and NIST guidance so that
covered entities under HIPAA76 can examine their own security programs
and incorporate some of the NIST recommendations into their risk
management programs.77 The NIST is quick to point out, however, that its
guidelines should not lead a provider to assume that such security
provisions will necessarily be HIPAA compliant78 or that any provider is
required to abide by the guidelines.79 Rather, the “crosswalk” should be
seen as a sort of best practice that can provide guidance on supplementing
the security regulations under HIPAA.80

70. A “crosswalk” is a term used to “describe a mechanism or approach to translating, comparing
or moving between meta data standards . . . or converting skills or content from one discipline to
another,” which in this instance means a mechanism for translating or comparing the HIPAA
regulations to the NIST data standards. See Karen Gross, Crosswalks, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC. OFF. OF
THE
UNDER SECRETARY (May 1, 2012), https://sites.ed.gov/ous/2012/05/crosswalks/
[https://perma.cc/H2DKZFEH] (internal citation omitted).
71. CROSSWALK, supra note 24.
72. Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., Public Affairs Office, About NIST, NIST.GOV,
https://www.nist.gov/about-nist [https://perma.cc/E55D-KTKR].
73. Id.
74. See CROSSWALK, supra note 24, at 1 (citing Exec. Order No. 13636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11739
(Feb. 12, 2013)).
75. Id.
76. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014).
77. CROSSWALK, supra note 24, at 1.
78. Id. at 2 (stating that the mappings are “intended to be an informative reference and do not
imply or guarantee compliance with any laws or regulations”).
79. Id.
80. Id. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Addressing Gaps in Cybersecurity: OCR
Releases Crosswalk Between HIPAA Security Rule and NIST Cybersecurity Framework, HHS.GOV,
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In addition to the NIST guidance, HHS also issued guidance in July
of 2016 in the form of a Q&A Fact Sheet (“Fact Sheet”) for the specific
purpose of describing “ransomware attack prevention and recovery from
a healthcare sector perspective, including the role . . . HIPAA . . . has in
assisting HIPAA covered entities and business associates to prevent and
recover from ransomware attacks, and how HIPAA breach notification
processes should be managed in response to a ransomware attack.”81
Noting that there has been a 300% increase in reported ransomware attacks
since 2015, the Fact Sheet asks and answers eight questions ranging from
explanations of ransomware itself to helping HIPAA covered entities
understand how to undertake an analysis as to whether an attack
constitutes a breach under HIPAA.82 HHS states in the guidance that the
Security Rule does contain some requirements that may “help prevent
introduction of malware, including ransomware,”83 but concedes that the
Security Rule simply sets forth minimum requirements and recommends
that entities implement more rigorous standards for purposes of securing
Protected Health Information (PHI).84 One of HHS’ aims in releasing the
Fact Sheet is to answer lingering questions regarding how such attacks
should be characterized under HIPAA.85 HHS makes clear that such
attacks constitute a “security incident” under the Security Rules, thus
initiating the security incident response and reporting procedures.86
Whether ransomware attacks constitute a breach under HIPAA’s Privacy
Rule, however, is based upon the facts of a particular incident, according
to HHS.87 HHS recognizes that in many instances of ransomware attacks,
the particular victim may be unable to determine while the system was
being held captive if such data was accessed and may require an analysis
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/nist-security-hipaa-crosswalk/index.html?
language =es [https://perma.cc/3XD6-BDDH].
81. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Fact Sheet: Ransomware and HIPAA, HHS.GOV (July
11, 2016), http://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/RansomwareFactSheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8YL4K6Q] [hereinafter Ransomware Fact Sheet].
82. Id. at 1.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1–2. See also 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014) (“Protected Health Information” is defined
as “(1) individually identifiable health information that is: (i) Transmitted by electronic media; (ii)
Maintained in electronic media; (iii) Transmitted or maintained in any other form or medium. (2)
Protected health information excludes individually identifiable health information: (i) In education
records covered by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, as amended, 20 U.S.C. 1232g; (ii)
In records described at 20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv); (iii) In employment records held by a covered
entity in its role as employer; and (iv) Regarding a person who has been decreased for more than 50
years.”).
85. Ransomware Fact Sheet, supra note 81, at 4–7.
86. Id. at 4.
87. Id.
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of the particular malware algorithm to really understand whether any data
was accessed.88 Ultimately, HHS advises providers that they will have to
undertake the same analysis in determining whether the breach, based on
its specific facts, is reportable as a breach to those affected.89
B. Ransomware Attacks
Although the government has taken some measures to assure security
of EHRs, over the past five or six years a number of factors have led to an
environment in which these security breaches have become increasingly
common. Certainly, data breaches and security concerns are not new in the
healthcare industry.90 Since HIPAA regulations first went into effect in
2003, there have been multiple reports of breaches, although until recently
most breaches have been small-scale, such as stolen or lost laptops.91
Within the last two to three years, however, smaller breaches have
morphed into larger-scale HIPAA breaches, such as hackers infiltrating
the networks of large health systems and insurers.92 According to an HHS
database maintained for breaches affecting more than 500 individuals,
there have been 193 reported incidences of breaches as a result of
“hacking/IT incident” since 2009, at least nine of which affected more than
one million individuals.93 Such breaches have included a hack into a
database of almost 80 million personal consumer records at Anthem Inc.,
a large health insurer,94 and a hack affecting the personal data of more than
4.5 million patients into Community Health System, a publicly traded
hospital company with more than 200 hospitals in twenty-nine states at the

88. Id. at 6.
89. See generally id.
90. See Scannell & Chon, supra note 17.
91. Cindy Gallee, The Importance of Data Encryption and Security Rules: Breaches of
Electronic Protected Health Information Under HIPAA and HITECH, 26 DCBA BRIEF 16, 18 (June
2014).
92. See Scannell & Chon, supra note 17. This is not to imply that small-scale breaches have
ceased. On the contrary, there have been more than eighty breaches affecting more than 500
individuals in the first six months of 2016 for breaches unrelated to hackers or other IT incidents. See
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Office for Civil Rights, Breaches Affecting 500 or
More Individuals, HHS.GOV, https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/breach/breach_report.jsf;jsessionid=
78DDA9A0C78B25921265CE8E312BC929.worker1 [https://perma.cc/YC6D-K6AJ] (based on a
review of all breaches reported since 2009).
93. Id. (based on review of breaches in excess of one million individuals as a result of
“hacking/IT incident”).
94. Andrea Peterson, 2015 is Already the Year of the Health-Care Hack—and It’s Only Going
to Get Worse, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2015/03/20/2015-is-already-the-year-of-the-health-care-hack-and-its-only-going-to-getworse/?utm_term=.ed5999920f0c [https://perma.cc/5LFM-RCPQ].
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time of the incident.95 In contrast to ransomware attacks, which seem
focused on cutting off access to an electronic system, it appears that these
large-scale hacks are for the purpose of obtaining the personal information
contained within the records.96 Based on the investigations of these
attacks, the hackers appear to be accessing personal information on
patients and insureds, such as names, addresses, birthdates, telephone
numbers, and social security numbers. Significantly, not all attacks have
accessed financial or medical information.97
Observers have identified two possible reasons for these attacks.98
First, the data that is being accessed is the type of data frequently targeted
by criminals who then sell the “hacked” data on the black market.99 Much
of the same information that can be obtained by accessing credit card
information is accessible through medical records, but use of medical data
by identity thieves is much more difficult to detect than data obtained
through credit card theft.100 Many of the large-scale data breaches have
been traced back to individuals in China,101 and some theorists speculate
that the hackers could be working on behalf of the Chinese government in

95. Beth Kutscher & Joseph Conn, Chinese Hackers Hit Community Health Systems; Others
Vulnerable, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/
20140818/NEWS/308189946 [https://perma.cc/VV23-Y5B4]. Note that since the breach incident in
2014, Community Health Systems has sold off some of its hospitals, and at the time of this Article, it
owned and operated 158 hospitals in twenty-two states. See Locations, COMMUNITY HEALTH SYS.,
http://www.chs.net/serving-communities/locations/ [https://perma.cc/F8SC-6ZV4].
96. See Ransomware Fact Sheet, supra note 81 (defining ransomware’s defining characteristic
to be that it “attempts to deny access to a user’s data, usually by encrypting the data with a key known
only to the hacker who deployed the malware, until a ransom is paid,” but noting that “hackers may
deploy ransomware that also destroys or exfiltrates data”).
97. See Kutcher & Conn, supra note 95.
98. Scannell & Chon, supra note 17; Kim Zetter, Why Hospitals Are the Perfect Targets for
Ransomware, WIRED (Mar. 30, 2016, 1:31 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/ransomware-whyhospitals-are-the-perfect-targets/ [https://perma.cc/N6LC-P7BM] [hereinafter Zetter I].
99. Scannell & Chon, supra note 17; see also Peterson, supra note 94 (“Health organizations are
targets because they maintain troves of data with significant resale value in black markets . . . and their
security practices are often less sophisticated than other industries. . . . Some of the data can be used
to pursue traditional financial crimes[—]like setting up fraudulent lines of credit. . . . But it can also
be used for medical insurance fraud, like purchasing medical equipment for resale or obtaining pricey
medical care for another person. This type of scheme is often not caught as quickly as financial fraud,
experts said, and could have a lasting affect if it results in a person’s medical history containing false
information.”).
100. Scannell & Chon, supra note 17 (noting that because of the longer “shelf life” of a medical
record, and due to the lack of detectability by law enforcement, medical records are valued anywhere
between $200 and $2,000 per record on the black market, as opposed to $1 for a credit card record).
101. Id.
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an effort to learn how insurers and healthcare companies in the United
States address healthcare challenges and population health.102
In contrast, the goal behind the more recent ransomware attacks, such
as that against MedStar, seems to be financially driven, that is, payment of
the bitcoin ransom.103 Ransomware, which Wired Magazine has referred
to as “digital extortion,” began in about 2005 and has only grown since its
inception.104 Ransomware is defined as “malware that locks your keyboard
or computer to prevent you from accessing your data until you pay a
ransom, usually demanded in Bitcoin.”105 It can affect various types of
computer technology, including desktop computers, laptops, and mobile
phones.106 Historically, the typical means by which ransomware attacks a
system is through an email that, at first, appears legitimate, but when the
recipient opens it and clicks on the attachment or a URL site, the
attachment or website contains a ransomware code that infects the
recipient’s computer or smart phone with malicious software.107 The
malicious software “begins encrypting files and folders on local drives,
any attached drives, backup drives, and potentially other computers on the
same network that the victim computer is attached to.”108 Ransomware
hackers have become much more sophisticated, however, and have
developed techniques that bypass emails or the need for individuals to
click on a link; rather, hackers can seed legitimate websites with malicious
code that will infiltrate computers through known gaps in security
systems.109 Often, the recipient of the malicious software is entirely
unaware of what is happening until they are unable to access the computer

102. Id. (“American investigators believe hackers in China target insurers in the US . . . to learn
how medical coverage and insurer databases are set up, people familiar with the cases said. The records
are also valuable for intelligence purposes. Addressing healthcare challenges has been a top priority
of the Chinese government, which is facing an ageing and affluent population that is demanding better
care. ‘China is very interested in anything that will help them with the illnesses they are dealing with
and changes in their population.’”).
103. Zetter I, supra note 98.
104. Id.
105. Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: A Guide to Ransomware, the Scary Hack That’s on the Rise,
WIRED (Sept. 17, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/09/hacker-lexicon-guide-ransomware-scaryhack-thats-rise/ [https://perma.cc/D6Q7-QZMK] [hereinafter Zetter II].
106. Id.
107. Incidents of Ransomware on the Rise, U.S. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Apr. 29,
2016), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2016/april/incidents-of-ransomware-on-the-rise/incidentsof-ransomware-on-the-rise [https://perma.cc/KQ2C-WN78] [hereinafter FBI].
108. Id.
109. Id.
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system or have received a ransom note from the hacker.110 Such was the
case at MedStar.111
Ransomware has also grown exponentially as the ability to demand
and actually collect payment has become easier.112 Kim Zetter of Wired
Magazine noted,
Many of these early [ransomware] schemes had a big drawback for
perpetrators, though: a reliable way to collect money from victims.
In the early days, online payment methods weren’t popular the way
they are today, so some victims in Europe and the US were instructed
to pay ransoms via SMS messages or with pre-paid cards. But the
growth in digital payment methods, particularly Bitcoin, has greatly
contributed to ransomware’s proliferation. Bitcoin has become the
most popular method for demanding ransom because it helps
anonymize the transactions to prevent extortionists from being
tracked.113

In addition to ease of payment, ransomware attacks were further
spurred by the invention of CryptoLocker.114 CyptoLocker is software that
infects a computer with a virus initially for the purpose of stealing banking
credentials, but if the hacker is unable to obtain the credentials, the
software installs a “backdoor” on the affected computer to extort the
individual to pay money.115 CryptoLocker was the first of its kind to use
Bitcoin as the payment method, which made the payment (if and when
made) almost untraceable.116 After the invention of CryptoLocker, more
than 500,000 computers were infected over a six-month time period.117
While only a small percentage of victims paid the ransom demand, it
nevertheless has become big business for hackers, with the United States
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) estimating in 2014 that ransom
seekers made $27 million from those users who decided to pay.118
The FBI has issued several warnings within the past two years about
the rise in ransomware attacks, warning not only individuals but
businesses, government agencies, academic institutions, law enforcement
110. Id.
111. See Cox, supra note 2.
112. See Zetter II, supra note 105.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. (noting that CryptoLocker was invented by a hacker named Slavik).
116. Joseph Conn, Ransomware Scare: Will Hospitals Pay for Protection?, MOD. HEALTHCARE
(Apr. 9, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160409/MAGAZINE/304099988
[https://perma.cc/JCY9-Y4C4].
117. See Zetter II, supra note 105.
118. Id.
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agencies, hospitals, school districts, and state and local governments.119
The FBI has further noted that with the increase in attacks, there has also
been an increase in the amount of the payoffs being demanded and the
damage that is being caused to the individuals, businesses, and other
entities suffering from these attacks.120 Unfortunately, CryptoLocker is
now only one of several different types of malware, and the ability to guard
against these attacks is becoming increasingly challenging.121
The latest attacks against healthcare organizations seem to be related
to two specific types of ransomware, Locky and Samas.122 The Locky
virus, the same virus that infiltrated the EHRs of King’s Daughter’s Health
in Madison, Wisconsin is hidden within emails that are opened by an
unknowing individual and then moves through the system encrypting
computer files, thus locking them to the user until access is granted by the
ransomware attackers.123 Samas, thought to be the likely source of the
attack on MedStar, attacks certain vulnerabilities in web servers.124 With
the level of sophistication and manner in which these operations are
carried out, it is clear that the individuals behind the attacks are
professionals and that the healthcare industry is becoming a more common
and frequent target.125 Indeed, Beazley Breach Response Services126
reported only twelve incidents in 2015 affecting the healthcare industry
(with thirty-one ransomware attacks to other industries) but reported
eighteen such attacks in just the first three months of 2016 (with
twenty-two such attacks to other industries).127 Likewise, another report

119. Id.; FBI, supra note 107.
120. FBI, supra note 107.
121. See Zetter II, supra note 105.
122. Conn, supra note 116.
123. Id.; see also Akanksha Jayanthi, US, Canada Issue Joint Ransomware Alert After
String of Hospital Attacks, BECKER’S HEALTH IT & CIO REV. (Apr. 1, 2016),
http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/healthcare-information-technology/us-canada-issue-jointransomware-alert-after-string-of-hospital-attacks.html [https://perma.cc/2NGH-LGRJ].
124. Conn, supra note 116. The FBI issues two alerts to businesses in the spring of 2016 noting
that the ransomware Samas (also known as MSIL) attacks servers that are “running out of date versions
of a type of business software known as JBOSS,” which systems are identified by the hackers utilizing
a software tool known as JexBoss. Jim Finkle, FBI Wants U.S. Businesses to Help as Cyber Extortion
Gains Urgency, REUTERS (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-ransomwareidUSKCN0WU1GB [https://perma.cc/UTX8-JGW5].
125. Id.
126. Beazley Breach Response Services is a specialty insurance company that provides insurance
related to cybersecurity. Beazley Breach Response (BBR), BEAZLEY, https://www.beazley.com/
usa/specialty_lines/professional_liability/technology_media_and_business_services/beazley_breach
_response.html [https://perma.cc/95PD-GATX].
127. Id.
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from Accenture128 estimates that by 2019 one in thirteen patients will have
had their medical and personal information stolen due to healthcare
provider data breaches, and that those numbers will continue to rise.129
This increased attention to the healthcare sector by ransomware
attackers is, unfortunately, not surprising to many.130 While HITECH has
been largely successful in its goals of moving the healthcare industry into
the digital age in an effort to provide better and more coordinated care, it
has failed to acknowledge the culture that has risen up around the
importance of information technology (IT) and the long-term investment
necessary to sustain such systems.131 In a report issued by Peer 60,132 thirty
percent of hospital executives cited “improving information security” as a
concern, but more notably, eight other IT concerns were mentioned more
commonly as top concerns of these executives.133 As one critic noted,
Many of the small- or medium-sized health care organizations do not
view IT as an integral part of medical care but rather consider it as a
mandate that was forced on them by larger hospitals or the federal
government. Precisely due to this reason, health care organizations
do not prioritize IT and security technologies in their investments and
thus do not allocate required resources to ensure the security of their
128. Accenture is a consulting agency that provides consulting services regarding various sectors
of business, including digital services and technology. What We Do, ACCENTURE,
https://www.accenture.com/us-en/company [https://perma.cc/C3NU-NJCM].
129. Brian Kalis et al., The $300 Billion Attack: The Revenue Risk and Human Impact of
Healthcare Provider Cyber Security Inaction, ACCENTURE (2015), https://www.accenture.com/
t20150723T115443__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/Accenture/ConversionAssets/DotCom/Documents/
Global/PDF/Dualpub_19/Accenture-Provider-Cyber-Security-The-$300-Billion-Attack.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K8QB-JVR7] (estimating that by 2019, seven million patients will have their
medical information stolen, almost two million will become medical identity theft victims, and just
over one million patients will have to pay out-of-pocket costs related to medical identity theft,
effectively doubling the number of patients affected in 2015).
130. Monte Reel & Jordan Robertson, It’s Way Too Easy To Hack the Hospital, BLOOMBERG
BUS. WEEK (Nov. 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/features/2015-hospital-hack/ [https://perma.cc/
5429-QZLJ] (citing medical devices and lack of security in connection with such devices as a major
issue and a gateway for malware into hospital systems).
131. Yaraghi, supra note 55.
132. Peer60 is a marketing research company that provides services for various industries,
including healthcare. See Reaction, PEER60, https://www.peer60.com/solutions/ [https://perma.cc/
QPE2-XP5P].
133. See Rev360 Editor, Cybersecurity for Hospitals—the Road Ahead (Jan. 28, 2016),
http://revenue360.net/revenue360_modules/address_demographic_validation/cybersecurity-forhospitals-the-road-ahead/ [https://perma.cc/7VWB-LPWH] (citing the Peer60 report which noted the
following top challenges that the organization needs to address: 64% said “managing switch to value
based reimbursement models”; 56% said “coordinating care”; 54% said “managing patient
populations”; 48% said “patient engagement”; 47% said “shortages of physicians and nurses”; 36%
said “managing data”; 33% said “regulatory compliance”; and 31% said “meaningful ROI on IT
purchases”).
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IT systems which makes them especially vulnerable to privacy
breaches . . . . When it comes to data protection, big technology
companies are the war ships, and hospitals are small rubber dinghies
in a sea of hacker sharks. Since IT has not historically been an integral
part of medical services, hospitals have lagged behind other
industries on investing in security technologies and attracting top IT
talents and thus became especially weak and vulnerable to IT
attacks.134

Other critics have noted similar concerns related to the culture of the
healthcare industry when it comes to investment in technology
infrastructure and maintenance.135 Already required to make a substantial
capital investment in an electronic system, many providers are unwilling
to incur the additional expenses associated with maintenance and updates
to such system, much less adopt additional security measures beyond those
required by HIPAA, such as backup systems or other security measures
adopted by more technologically sophisticated industries.136 And yet, even
if a healthcare system has invested the capital and taken all necessary
actions to protect such data with the most up-to-date technology and
highest security, some argue that cybersecurity will forever remain
challenging and potentially elusive because human error remains one of
the biggest risks.137 This risk will continue to be an issue, even with
education and training, as malware attackers continue to refine their skills.
Thus, it appears that the healthcare industry is in the midst of a
“perfect storm” of circumstances that make it especially vulnerable to
these types of attacks. These circumstances include: (a) the industry, as a
whole, adopted the use of EHRs in a very rapid timeframe, with a focus
on compliance with HIPAA privacy and security regulations drafted for
the purpose of preventing disclosure of sensitive information, not guarding

134. Yaraghi, supra note 55.
135. Regina E. Herzlinger, Why Innovation in Health Care is So Hard, HARV. BUS. REV.,
May 2006, https://hbr.org/2006/05/why-innovation-in-health-care-is-so-hard (noting after the
implementation of HIPAA, but prior to the HITECH standards, that the healthcare industry is “near
the bottom of the ladder in terms of IT spending and uniform data standards”).
136. Stacy Cowley & Liam Stack, Los Angeles Hospital Pays Hackers $17,000 After Attack,
N.Y TIMES (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/19/business/los-angeles-hospitalpays-hackers-17000-after-attack.html?_r=0 (“Health care organizations seem to be particularly
vulnerable to hacking attacks because they have been slower to embrace sophisticated backup systems
and other security measures than other industries, like financial services, said Katherine Keefe, the
head of breach response services at Beazley, an insurance company.”).
137. John Halamka, The State of Information Security 2015, LIFE AS A HEALTHCARE CIO BLOG
(Dec. 9, 2015, 3:00 AM), http://geekdoctor.blogspot.com/2015/12/the-state-of-information-security2015.html [https://perma.cc/V6KG-D92X] (citing examples of most common entry of malware into a
system).
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against outside attacks;138 (b) malware and ransomware attacks have
become increasingly more prevalent as hackers,139 the software tools
available to them,140 and the ability to collect payment through Bitcoin
have become more sophisticated and exceedingly difficult to police;141 (c)
unlike in a retail sector, for example, health care providers blocked by
ransomware from accessing their EHR can result in very serious public
health and patient safety concerns that might lead many in the industry to
consider paying the ransom due to the dire consequences caused by lack
of access to their EHR systems;142 and (d) the health care industry culture,
perhaps as a result of the rapid adoption of EHR as necessitated by federal
regulations and the costs associated with such systems, does not appear to
have yet embraced the need for security regulations outside of mere
HIPAA compliance.143 While increased vigilance and greater security
protections are obvious responses, one questions whether such responses
are truly enough to assure greater protection of patient data and the
operation and safety of hospitals, doctors’ offices, and other healthcare
facilities that are so vulnerable to these attacks.
II. CURRENT LEGAL AND BUSINESS RESPONSES
A. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Although the HIPAA Security Rule is perhaps the primary source for
healthcare entities seeking to protect data from cyberattacks, there are
other federal laws that have been enacted in order to protect personal data,
such as health records, from hackers.144 Originally enacted as part of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,145 the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act (CFAA) was the first federal law to address computer crime.146
Prior to the CFAA, prosecutors relied on mail and/or wire fraud laws for

138. See Yaraghi, supra note 55.
139. FBI, supra note 107.
140. Zetter II, supra note 105.
141. See FBI, supra note 107.
142. See Winton, supra note 15; Cox, supra note 2.
143. See Snell, supra note 67.
144. See Katherine Booth Wellington, Cyberattacks on Medical Devices and Hospital Networks:
Legal Gaps and Regulatory Solutions, 30 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 139, 151–52 (2014).
145. See Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 2190, 2190–92 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030). Note that, when enacted,
the law was referred to as the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984,
but was shortened to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act after an amendment to the law in 1986.
146. United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir. 1991).
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most computer-related crimes.147 While the first version of the CFAA was
rather limited in scope,148 the law was extensively amended in 1986 and
has since been amended numerous times.149 As amended, the CFAA
punishes individuals who knowingly, intentionally, and maliciously
transmit code or access protected computers and such action causes harm,
including attacks against hospital EHRs.150 The penalties for violating the
CFAA can be quite steep, and can result in a fine, imprisonment for not
more than ten years, or both for a first offense in which the individual
“intentionally causes damage without authorization to a protected
computer.”151 The CFAA also imposes penalties for an individual who
“intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization and as
a result of such conduct, recklessly causes damage,” which can result in a
fine, imprisonment up to five years, or both.152
While the penalties are potentially steep and the language of the
CFAA is quite broad in its application,153 most of the prosecutions under
147. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., United States v. Nosal: Rebooting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
8 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 257, 262 (2012).
148. For example, under the first version of the law, enacted in 1984, only federal government
computers and computers owned by large financial institutions were subject to the law in an effort to
provide the Secret Service with authority to investigate certain computer crimes. Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976. Likewise, earlier versions of the law
required an actual interstate or foreign communication. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2007).
149. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. OFF. LEGAL EDUC., PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES (2010),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ccmanual.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H7HR-TXLV]; see also Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99474, 100 Stat. 1213; Computer Abuse Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2097,
enacted as Title XXIX of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
2013-322, 108 Stat. 1796; Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, tit. II, 110 Stat.
3488, 3491; Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA Patriot Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272; Identity
Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008, codified as Title II of the Former Vice President
Protection Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-326, 122 Stat. 3560 (2008).
150. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A), (B) (2012).
151. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (2008).
152. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i) (2008).
153. See Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1127
(W.D. Wash. 2000) (finding that amendments to the CFAA and congressional reports indicate that the
statute was meant to be applied broadly). Note, however, that certain provisions of the CFAA that
include specific language related to when an employee is using a computer “without authorization”
have been interpreted rather narrowly by certain circuits and broadly by others. See United States v.
John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010);
and EF Cultural Travel BV. v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001) (all holding that an
employee could be in violation of the CFAA if the employee accessed information on the computer
without permission, even if the employer did not take means to make such information inaccessible).
But see United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 864 (9th Cir. 2012) and WEC Carolina Energy Solutions
LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012) (each holding that “without authorization” under the
CFAA is limited to situations where the employee no longer has access to the information, as such
provision is intended for “outside” hackers).
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the CFAA have been focused on individuals such as employees or
independent contractors, and much of the defense centers around whether
such individual had “authorization” under the statute to access the
protected computer.154 In fact, there have been few instances of
prosecution under the CFAA of unknown criminal hackers.155 One of the
reasons that hackers have been less likely to be prosecuted under the
CFAA is because of the complexities and challenges associated with
identifying and apprehending a hacker, especially individuals located in
foreign jurisdictions.156 Computer networks in general are vastly
complicated, consisting of the use of various private networks (such as a
virtual private network (or VPN) that encrypts the data sent over such
network and protects the applicable internet protocol (IP) address).157
Healthcare entities use such VPN networks to ensure protection of data
that may be accessed remotely by employees or agents.158 As Larry
Greenemeier points out, however, when it comes to hackers, this can
become even more complex:
Cyber attackers use viruses, worms and other malware to take control
of Internet servers or even personal computers, creating a network of
154. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 149, at 6–12; Larkin, supra note 147. Perhaps
the most notable prosecution under the CFAA was the conviction of Aaron Swartz, a twenty-six yearold, self-described internet activist who was prosecuted under the CFAA after he downloaded a large
number of articles from a website called JSTOR that contains academic documents. While Swartz had
a JSTOR account, he downloaded nearly the entire JSTOR library to a computer at the Massachusetts
Institution of Technology for the purpose of allowing others to access it (“open data”). Swartz was
charged with eleven felony violations under the CFAA and faced up to thirty-five years in prison. He
committed suicide before his trial. John Schwartz, Internet Activist, a Creator of RSS, Is Dead at 26,
Apparently a Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/technology/
aaron-swartz-internet-activist-dies-at-26.html?r=0. One of the key questions in the case was whether
or not Swartz had “authorization” under the CFAA. See James Hendler, It’s Time to Reform the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, SCI. AM. (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.scientificamerican.com/
article/its-times-reform-computer-fraud-abuse-act/ [https://perma.cc/F3HZ-BSPA] (arguing that the
CFAA has been overly prosecuted and needs to be reformed).
155. See Wellington, supra note 144 (citing United States v. McGraw, No. 3:09-CR-0210-B,
2012 WL 6004208 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2012); United States v. McGraw, No. 3:09-CR-0210-B, 2012
WL 6013258 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2012) in which Jesse McGraw was convicted under the CFAA in
connection with accessing a hospital network and downloading malicious software).
156. Larry Greenemeier, Seeking Address: Why Cyber Attacks Are So Difficult to Trace Back to
Hackers, SCI. AM. (June 11, 2011), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/tracking-cyberhackers/ [https://perma.cc/3ELM-WZJT].
157. Id. (“By way of example, Nicol points out that he uses a virtual private network that
connects to a proxy server before connecting him to the Internet. This enables him to encrypt data he
sends over the network and protect the identity of his own Internet protocol (IP) address. ‘I do this to
thwart information harvesting that commercial Web sites usually have,’ he adds.”).
158. SSL Servs. LLC v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 769 F.3d 1073, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (defining a
“virtual private network” as “system for securing communications between computers over an open
network such as the Internet”).
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“zombie” computers (also called botnets) under their control that they
can use to launch their attacks. As a result, an attack may appear to
come from a particular server or computer, but this does not mean the
attack originated at that device, . . . [and] often a string of proxies
located in different countries are used in an attack, “greatly
complicating the legal process of trying to piece it all together.”159

Hackers have the ability to not only encrypt their identity through software
or “mask” their IP addresses but also leave “false flags” that will implicate
other individuals, which leads one to believe that the hacker was an
entirely different person.160 Thus, hackers are, by design, almost
impossible to identify with certainty.161
Independent of the challenges in simply locating a particular
individual or network of individuals who may be responsible, there are
various jurisdictional issues created by the fact that many hackers hail
from locations outside the United States.162 Historically, China has been a
particularly common place for hackers, but attacks have also originated in
Russia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and various Western countries.163
With origination of these attacks in various countries, one of the main
issues is attributing the particular cyberattack to a particular individual or
group and then obtaining cooperation from other law enforcement officials
in other countries (assuming such countries have similar laws that might
criminalize cyber or computer fraud).164 While there has been some
159. Greenemeier, supra note 156. Duncan Hollis has described a similar scenario in more real
life terms:
Imagine Twitter falls victim to a cyberattack. Twitter’s systems keep a record . . . of every
IP address visiting its site, which allows it to identify the attacker’s IP address. It can then
use the IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority) database to identify which internet
service provider (ISP) was assigned to that IP address. If that ISP keeps good records, it
could tell Twitter to which computer’s modem it had assigned that address. . . . ISPs
regularly empty out their logs. . . . Thus, sourcing requests have to happen quickly;
otherwise, any evidence to identify perpetrators is gone. Even where there are records, the
IP address might go with a corporate account, numbering thousands of users. Or, the trial
might end sooner if it goes to a coffee house that gives users free access, no questions
asked. Assuming Twitter can actually trace the IP address back to a single user, it might
find that the computer had been captured. . . . In effect, attackers can ‘launder’ the packets
so that the attack’s true origins will be difficult, if not impossible, to find.
Duncan B. Hollis, An E-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373, 398–99 (2011).
160. Hollis, supra note 159, at 397 (“The most sophisticated cyber exploitations may never be
discovered. A high-level attack might be attributed to mere computer error. This situation is unlikely
to change anytime soon; it is a systematic aspect of the Internet, not a simply problem to be fixed.”).
161. See id.
162. Joseph Menn, Analysis: The Near Impossible Battle Against Hackers Everywhere,
REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2013, 3:04 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybersecurity-battleidUSBRE91N03520130224 [https://perma.cc/MMB7-E46R].
163. Id.
164. Hollis, supra note 159, at 392.
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international cooperation with respect to cyberattacks, including the
Convention on Cybercrime, which is now joined by twenty-nine European
countries and the U.S.,165 such laws do not necessarily include attacks
coming from a military or intelligence agency, or individuals or groups
acting pursuant to a lawful government authority.166 This exclusion
includes activities that may be done for investigation purposes or to protect
national security, which has led to a lack of clarity regarding when the
activity of a country might otherwise have qualified as a cybercrime.167
Even with uniformity in the laws and some international cooperation
regarding enforcement, anonymity, and the ability to actually identify the
hackers remains elusive.168
B. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act
Given some of the challenges in attempting to apprehend and
prosecute cyber attackers, there are other statutory responses that endeavor
to aid in exchange of data to facilitate more coordinated and robust
defenses. For example, in response to the recent increase in ransomware
attacks across all industries and increasing concerns with cybersecurity
generally the U.S. Congress enacted the Cybersecurity Information
Sharing Act (CISA) in 2015.169 Unlike the CFAA, which is focused on
enforcement, the CISA is instead centered on the idea that cybersecurity
threats, especially those related to national security, may potentially be
thwarted or at least diminished by greater sharing of threat information.170
The sharing of information is entirely voluntary under the CISA, but the
intention is to address what has been a major barrier with the sharing of
this data. This would assuage fears on the part of companies that
monitoring and implementing defensive mechanisms or sharing the data
with others could result in liability under any number of laws,171 including
165. Convention on Cybercrime, Council of Europe, Nov. 23, 2001, C.E.T.S. No. 185,
http://www.coe.int/fr/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185.
166. Hollis, supra note 159, at 393.
167. Id. at 393–94.
168. Id. at 397.
169. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) was passed as part of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242 (Dec. 18, 2015).
170. Brad S. Karp, Federal Guidance on the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 3, 2016), https://corpgov.law.
harvard.edu/2016/03/03/federal-guidance-on-the-cybersecurity-information-sharing-act-of-2015/
[https://perma.cc/L7HT-L5WG].
171. There is criticism regarding the CISA that it does not do enough to protect personal data
because it shares information and that the sharing of information with the federal government could
be a threat to civil liberties, even if the law does exempt companies from liability concerns. See Everett
Rosenfeld, The Controversial “Surveillance” Act Obama Just Signed, CNBC (Dec. 22, 2015, 12:34
PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/22/the-controversial-surveillance-act-obama-just-signed.html
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the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,172 the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA),173 antitrust laws,174 privacy laws (such as HIPAA
and HITECH),175 and potentially a waiver of attorney–client privilege or
similar protections.176
In order to guard against potential application of these laws, the
CISA contains a number of provisions that endeavor to accomplish this
goal. First, the CISA contains an express federal preemption pursuant to
which the CISA “supersedes any statute or other provision of law of a State
or political subdivision of a State that restricts or otherwise expressly
regulates an activity authorized under [the CISA].”177 This preemption is
limited, however, by any other law “concerning the use of authorized law
enforcement practices and procedures.”178 In addition to this express
preemption, there are a number of other provisions that provide additional
protections (and encouragement) for companies to share information
regarding cyberattacks. Specifically, the CISA permits a company to
“monitor” and “operate defensive measures” for cybersecurity purposes
on its own systems or on a third-party system, with authorization from
such third party,179 thus enabling companies to monitor their systems
without the potential liability concerns of infringing on privacy rights of
individuals.180
Second, companies are permitted, notwithstanding any provision of
law to the contrary, to share information with or receive information from
federal, state, or local governments in connection with “cyber threat

[https://perma.cc/KL8N-87GV]; Graeme Caldwell, Why You Should Be Concerned About the
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, TECH CRUNCH (Feb. 7, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/
2016/02/07/why-you-should-be-concerned-about-cisa/ [https://perma.ccWZ89-ZHVM].
172. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2002) (extending government restrictions on wire taps to
electronic data used by a computer).
173. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2016) (allowing individuals the right to access certain
information/documentation held or controlled by the United States government).
174. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2004) (prohibiting competitors or would-be competitors from agreeing
or conspiring to agree to restrict trade).
175. The Privacy Rule and Security Rule are combined in the HIPAA Administrative
Simplification Regulations found at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 162, and 164 (2013).
176. Karp, supra note 170. Please note that attorney–client privilege and requirements for waiver
of such privilege are matters of state law and will vary from state to state. In general, there is a fear
that reporting information regarding cyberattacks while still investigating the origins of the attack and
the information that was accessed as part of such cyberattack may waive any privilege that exists.
177. 6 U.S.C. § 1507(k)(1) (2015).
178. 6 U.S.C. § 1507(k)(2) (2015).
179. 6 U.S.C. § 1503(a)(1)(A)–(D); 6 U.S.C. § 1503(b)(1)(A)–(C) (2015).
180. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, CYBERTREND (Dec. 10, 2015),
https://www.cybertrend.com/article/19423/cybersecurity-information-sharing-act [perma.cc/57Y6HL3X].
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indicators”181 or “defensive measures,”182 so long as such measures are for
cybersecurity purposes.183 As alluded to above, because of the application
of various existing laws and fears regarding the sharing of personal data,
companies have been reticent to share any information regarding
cyberattacks or cyber threats.184 Congress surmises, however, that such
information would be very helpful in preventing attacks and identifying
attackers because it would enable a government authority to develop
means to prevent common schemes and to recognize the markers and
“signatures” of common hackers, thus making them easier to identify.185
Although the law provides for preemption, in an attempt to maintain some
of the original intent of the various privacy laws in place, the CISA
requires that companies remove any information that is not directly related
to a cybersecurity threat and that the company knows to be personal
information identifying a particular person.186 Lastly, so long as all of the
provisions for sharing under the CISA are followed, the CISA provides
protections against liability in connection with data sharing,187 prosecution

181. The statute defines cyber threat indicator as
information that is necessary to describe or identify- (A) malicious reconnaissance . . . (B)
a method of defeating a security control or exploitation of a security vulnerability; (C) a
security vulnerability . . . (D) a method of causing a user with legitimate access to an
information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an
information system to unwittingly enable the defeat of a security control or exploitation of
a security vulnerability; (E) malicious cyber command and control; (F) the actual or
potential harm caused by an incident . . . (G) any other attribute of a cyber security threat,
if disclosure of such attribute is not otherwise prohibited by law; or (H) any combination
thereof.
6 U.S.C. § 1501(6) (2015).
182. A “defensive measure” is defined as “an action, device, procedure, signature, technique, or
other measure applied to an information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or
transiting an information system that detects, prevents, or mitigates a known or suspected
cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability.” 6 U.S.C. § 1501(7)(A) (2015).
183. Id.
184. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & DEP’T OF JUST., GUIDANCE TO ASSIST NON-FEDERAL
ENTITIES TO SHARE CYBER THREAT INDICATORS AND DEFENSIVE MEASURES WITH FEDERAL
ENTITIES UNDER THE CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION SHARING ACT OF 2015 (June 15, 2016),
https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/ais_files/Non-Federal_Entity_Sharing_Guidance_
%28Sec%20105%28a%29%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Q7K-RWSM] [hereinafter GUIDANCE].
185. Id.
186. 6 U.S.C. § 1503(d)(2)(A)–(B) (2015).
187. 6 U.S.C. § 1505(b)(1) (2015); 6 U.S.C. § 1505(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2015) (protecting against
liability in any court against any private entity for the sharing or receipt of a cyber threat indicator or
defensive measure, so long as shared through the Department of Homeland Security process).
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under antitrust laws,188 attorney–client privilege waiver concerns,189
liability related to disclosure of proprietary information,190 application
from FOIA provisions,191 and use of information to regulate other lawful
activity.192
1. Healthcare Task Force
Perhaps recognizing both the extensive privacy concerns and the lack
of readiness and preparedness of the healthcare industry in combating
cyberattacks, the CISA contains a specific section relating to the
healthcare industry and stresses the need for increased vigilance in this
sector.193 Under Section 1533 of the CISA, HHS is required to issue a
report divisions within one year from the date of enactment on its
preparedness to respond to cybersecurity threats, including a statement
regarding who will lead and coordinate the efforts and how divisions and
subdivisions194 will divide responsibilities and communicate across.195
Additionally, CISA directed HHS to convene a task force made up of
healthcare industry stake holders, cybersecurity experts, and others as
determined by other agencies or the Secretary of HHS for the purpose of
planning a single system in which the federal government and those in the
healthcare industry can share information regarding cybersecurity threats
and also make recommendations for protections for network medical

188. 6 U.S.C. § 1503(e)(1) (2015) (limiting such waiver only if the sharing of information is for
the purpose of preventing, investigating, or mitigating threats). It should be noted, however, that
Section 1507(e) of the statute expressly states that the antitrust exemption set forth in Section 1503
shall not “be construed to permit price-fixing, allocating a market between competitors, monopolizing
or attempting to monopolize a market, boycotting, or exchanges of price or cost information, customer
lists, or information regarding future competitive planning.” 6 U.S.C. § 1507(e) (2015). Thus, the only
exemptions under antitrust law appear to be limited to those activities that fall outside per se violations
of the Sherman Act or involve the sharing of information that leads to per se violations. 6 U.S.C. §
1507 (2015).
189. 6 U.S.C. § 1504(d)(1) (2015) (waiving attorney–client privilege and related legal
protections, including trade secrets, but limited only for sharing under the CISA—and not to state or
local governments or other third parties).
190. 6 U.S.C. § 1504(d)(2) (2015) (noting that proprietary information will not be further
disclosed so long as the disclosing entity designates such information as proprietary).
191. 6 U.S.C. § 1504(d)(3) (2015).
192. 6 U.S.C. § 1504(d)(5)(D)(i) (2015) (prohibiting use of any information shared for the
purpose of regulating (including an enforcement action) lawful activities of a private party).
193. 6 U.S.C. § 1533 (2015).
194. HHS has eleven operating divisions, eight agencies within the U.S. Public Health Service,
and three human services agencies. For a complete list, see HHS Agencies & Offices, HHS.GOV,
http://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/hhs-agencies-and-offices/index.html
[https://perma.cc/SN699ZLA].
195. 6 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (2015).
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devices and EHRs.196 Recognizing that the healthcare industry can likely
utilize existing resources from industries that already have highly
developed security protection systems and capabilities, the task force is
specifically instructed to “analyze how industries, other than the
healthcare industry, have implemented strategies and safeguards for
addressing cybersecurity threats within their respective industries.”197 The
task force is required to complete its task within one year, and it has sixty
days after its termination to disseminate its findings to the healthcare
industry for purposes of utilizing recommendations by healthcare
entities.198 HHS has published little information about its progress, only
naming the members of the task force—made up of members representing
hospitals, insurers, patient advocates, security researchers, pharmacy and
pharmaceutical companies, medical device manufacturers, health
information technology developers and vendors, and laboratories—and
noting the dates on which the task force held its four in-person meetings
(and some periodic teleconferences with tasks), which were to be
completed by March 2017.199 Thus, Congress and other security experts
appear to acknowledge that the healthcare industry is particularly
vulnerable and exposed in terms of its capacity and ability to deal with and
combat cybersecurity issues.200
2. Federal Guidance
Pursuant to CISA requirements, HHS and the U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ) issued guidance on February 16, 2016 and published an
updated version of such guidance on June 15, 2016 (collectively, the
“Guidance”).201 The Guidance was intended to assist private entities in
understanding how information under CISA should be shared with the
federal government.202 The Guidance acknowledges that while the CISA
does permit an entity to share information for cybersecurity purposes
notwithstanding any other provision of law (including HIPAA and
HITECH), it does nevertheless require the removal of any information that
196. 6 U.S.C. § 1533(c) (2015).
197. 6 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(1)(A) (2015).
198. 6 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(2) & (3) (2015).
199. Care Industry Cybersecurity Task Force, PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY, http://www.phe.gov/
preparedness/planning/CyberTF/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/M842-TGWD]. Note that the
in-person meetings will be open to the public, but the teleconferences in between are intended for
administrative issues only and will not be open to the public. Id.
200. Id. (noting that “healthcare data may be used for a variety of nefarious purposes, including
fraud, identify theft, and disruption of hospitals systems” and that leaving such systems unprotected
could cause a risk to patient safety and thus should be afforded the highest level of care).
201. GUIDANCE, supra note 184.
202. Id.
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it knows to be personal or that identifies a particular individual who is not
directly related to a cybersecurity threat.203 Highlighting particularly
sensitive information where this might most frequently arise, there is
specific reference in the Guidance to, among other sensitive information,
PHI.204 The Guidance states:
[S]haring [certain sensitive categories of information] in a form that
constitutes or includes personal information of a specific individual
or information that identifies a specific individual may not be
necessary. For instance, while sharing the medical condition of a
particular individual targeted for a phishing attack is unlikely to be
useful or directly related to a cybersecurity threat, sharing an
anonymized characterization of the cyber threat may have utility.205

Thus, the Guidance clarifies that the expectation of the federal
government is that the information that is shared is “technical information
that describes the attributes of a cybersecurity threat that generally need
not include various categories of information that are considered
sensitive.”206 Finally, the Guidance highlights the various processes that
can be utilized to share the data under the CISA, including an “Automated
Indicator Sharing” (AIS) system,207 submission of information by
completing a web form on the Department of Homeland Security website,
email submissions through the National Cybersecurity and
Communications Integration Center (through a web-based portal), or
through the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers or Information
Sharing and Analysis Organizations.208 These centers are private
organizations that will share the information with the Department of
Homeland Security on behalf of the disclosing entity.209 Given the report
required to be issued by HHS and the goals and purpose of the task force
for healthcare, it is not entirely clear if healthcare entities wishing to report
under the CISA will continue to report by the methods set forth in the
203. Id. at 8.
204. Id. at 9–10 (mentioning human resource information, consumer information/history,
education history, financial information, property ownership information, and information identifying
children under the age of 13).
205. Id. at 8.
206. Id. at 8–9.
207. Id. at 13. This system enables timely exchange of data in a secure manner, utilizing the
Structured Threat Information eXchange (STIX) and Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator
Information (TAXII), which requires the user to have TAXII capabilities that communicate with the
government’s TAXII servers.
208. Id. at 13-14.
209. Id. There are other means of sharing set forth in the Guidance, but only the sharing
mechanisms set forth above will enable the entity to access the liability and waiver protections set
forth under the CISA. Id. at 15.
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Guidance or if there will be an entirely different process or procedure
established that is uniquely designed for the healthcare industry.210
3. CISA Criticisms and Challenges
While the intention of the CISA was to ease communication between
government and companies when it comes to cyberattacks in order to
potentially combat and prevent them, there are critics of the law who are
concerned that, despite attempts to the contrary, the statute will
compromise privacy concerns.211 Indeed, it took more than four years for
the bill to be enacted into law, in large part because of the very strong
opposition by privacy experts and civil libertarians, who argued that the
broad language in the law would provide the government with access to
sensitive information from private entities and could allow use of the
information for other purposes.212
Still other critics believe that this law does not go far enough to
prevent these attacks.213 These critics are concerned that, because sharing
information is entirely voluntary, companies do not have sufficient
incentives or motivation to report cyberattacks and cyber threats any more
than they did previously.214 Additionally, there are concerns that any
response that can be generated or created as a result of the information
sharing will be too little, too late.215 As Abigail Tracey stated,
Many argue that cybercrime evolves at a rate that not only outpaced
the Senate’s legislation but that makes the sharing of information
210. See Joseph Conn, Federal Task Force Takes on Healthcare Cybersecurity, MOD.
HEALTHCARE (Apr. 16, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160416/MAGAZINE/
304169890 [https://perma.cc/MPK6-8FSK].
211. See Caldwell, supra note 171 (“The thing is, critics saw that bill as [a] way for government
agencies to more easily keep tabs on Americans without their knowledge. CISA was derided by
privacy advocates and tech titans alike. . . . In other words, organizations like the NSA and CIA now
have even more government protections allowing them to play fast and loose with personal privacy.
And our private information—already clearly at risk, given the large quantity of data breaches of late—
is now even more freely available.”).
212. Brett V. Newman, Hacking the Current System: Congress’ Attempt to Pass Data Security
and Breach Notification Legislation, 2015 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 437, 447–48 (2015) (discussing
privacy concerns and other challenges with passing the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of
2014).
213. Jay Shelton, Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act—Is it Enough?, ASSURANCE (Dec. 7,
2015),
http://www.assuranceagency.com/blog-post/cybersecurity-information-sharing-act-is-itenough [https://perma.cc/DFU4-WGK4] (“While most agree that CISA is a good start, many question
if the bill will go far enough in providing consumer data protections against network breaches.”).
214. Id.
215. Abigail Tracy, The Problems Experts and Privacy Advocates Have with the Senate’s
Cybersecurity Bill, FORBES (Oct. 29, 2015, 8:43 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/abigailtracy/
2015/10/29/the-problems-experts-and-privacy-advocates-have-with-the-senates-cybersecuritybill/#1729c3f430fc.
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across companies [sic] effectively useless because in many cases by
the time this happens, it is too late for corporations to defend
themselves. “Hackers are changing their methodologies in
milliseconds. Information sharing is going to take days, weeks, and
months. Will this idea keep up with the pace of sophisticated hackers?
That is the question that needs to be asked.”216

Although one year’s time for formation of a task force and issuance of its
report is rapid speed relative to government processes, the movement of
cyberattacks and the necessity to implement corresponding security
measures will likely far outpace the thoughtful process currently
underway.217 In response to critiques that the new law is not responding
decisively or rapidly enough, supporters, including the College of
Healthcare Information Management Executives and Healthcare
Information and Management Systems Society, contend that, at a
minimum, the law provides one resource that will direct the healthcare
industry to a set of best practices for cybersecurity.218 Further, supporters
argue that any law needs to remain voluntary until it is known what sorts
of guidelines or methods would be effective in combating cybercrime.219
C. Current State of the EHR Industry
The lack of consistent standards and best practices in the EHR
industry is caused at least in part by the current state of such industry.220
One notable obstacle in establishing optimal security measures for
purposes of guarding EHRs against hackers and ransomware attacks is the
sheer number of EHR companies and EHR systems.221 In 2013, Medical
216. Id. (quoting Craig Newman, an expert on cyber law and chair of the Privacy and Data
Security practice at Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP).
217. David Harlow, CISA: Big Brother is Watching, HEALTHBLAWG (Dec. 22, 2015),
http://healthblawg.com/2015/12/cisa-big-brother-is-watching.html [https://perma.cc/4MN7-29HB]
(“The notion of analyzing cybersecurity threats at one point in time via a task force that will sunset
out of existence after delivering its report simply is not a realistic response to the dynamic nature of
the threat environment today.”).
218. John Frank, Don’t Expect Legislative Defenses Against Cyberattacks Anytime Soon, MED.
ECON. (Apr. 10, 2016), http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-economics/news/
don-t-expect-legislative-defenses-against-cyberattacks-anytime-soon?page=0%2C1
[https://perma.cc/PWE7-Z3RQ].
219. Id.
220. HENRY ET AL., supra note 32 (noting that while the number of providers adopting an EHR
have greatly increased, there remains variability with the adoption of functionalities and use of such
EHRs).
221. See Ryan Shay, EHR Adoption Rates: 19 Must-See Stats, PRACTICE FUSION: PRACTICE
FUSION BLOG (Jan.
1,
2016),
http://www.practicefusion.com/blog/ehr-adoption-rates/
[https://perma.cc/39FE-PVKM] (noting approximately 1,100 EHR vendors currently, which is double
the amount that existed four years ago).
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Economics noted that the government’s best estimate was that there were
729 companies offering certified EHR systems for medical providers.222
Medical Economics stated, however, that even the government estimates
are difficult to judge because basic financial information about public and
private companies is difficult to garner, and it speculated that the industry
is likely to witness consolidation or closure of weaker EHR companies.223
Just two years after the report by Medical Economics, the number of EHR
vendors has actually increased, and as predicted, some of the consolidation
predicted appears to be taking root, at least in terms of market share.224 For
example, more than 50% of the market share for individual healthcare
professionals is occupied by just five EHR companies (Epic Systems,
Allscripts, eClinicalWorks, NextGen Healthcare, and GE Healthcare) and
more than 60% of the market share for hospitals is comprised of just three
EHR companies (Cerner, MEDITECH, and Epic Systems).225 All of this
information is important and impactful when considering the EHR
landscape because providers do not want to have to make the costly and

222. Daniel R. Verdon, Top 100 EHRs: Why Understanding a Company’s Financial
Performance Today May Influence Purchasing Decisions Tomorrow, MED. ECON. (Oct. 25, 2013),
http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-economics/content/tags/ehr/top-100-ehrswhy-understanding-company-s-financial-performance-to [https://perma.cc/7HPJ-4FP2]. It should be
noted that Verdon’s article was reporting data from 2013, prior to when most of the “meaningful use”
regulations were mandatory. Verdon acknowledged that “some companies won’t be able to clear the
technological and regulatory hurdles of the government’s 2014 incentive program, conversion to the
International Classification of Diseases-10th revision (ICD-10) or the development costs to make it
happen.” Id.
223. Id.
224. See Office of the Nat’l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., Quick-Stats: Certified Health IT
Vendors and Editions Reported by Ambulatory Health Care Professionals Participating in the
Medicare EHR Incentive Program, HEALTH IT DASHBOARD, HEALTHIT.GOV (July 2016),
https://dashboard.healthit.gov/quickstats/pages/FIG-Vendors-of-EHRs-to-ParticipatingProfessionals.php (noting, “As of July 2016, 632 vendors supply certified health IT to 337,432
ambulatory primary care physicians, medical and surgical specialists, podiatrists, optometrists,
dentists, and chiropractors participating in the Medicare EHR Incentive Program”). This compares to
“175 certified health IT vendors [that] supply certified health IT to the 4,474 non-federal acute care
hospitals, including Critical Access hospitals, participating in the Medicare EHR Incentive Program.”
Office of the Nat’l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., Quick-Stats: Certified Health IT Vendors and
Editions Reported by Hospitals Participating in the Medicare EHR Incentive Program, HEALTH IT
DASHBOARD, HEALTHIT.GOV (July 2016), https://dashboard.healthit.gov/quickstats/pages/FIGVendors-of-EHRs-to-Participating-Hospitals.php [https://perma.cc/V6S6-Z2X6].
225. Helen Gregg, 50 Things to Know About Epic, Cerner, MEDITECH, McKesson,
athenahealth and Other Major EHR Vendors, BECKER’S HEALTH IT & CIO REV. (July 14, 2014),
http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/healthcare-information-technology/50-things-to-knowabout-epic-cerner-meditech-mckesson-athenahealth-and-other-major-ehr-vendors.html
[https://perma.cc/T843-93EW]. Becker’s Health IT Review noted in 2014 that just ten EHR
companies account for ninety percent of the total market.
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disruptive EHR transition more than once.226 Although providers are
loathe to change their existing EHR systems, having many smaller
companies (with fewer clients) in the market can lead to financial
instability within such smaller companies, leading to an increase in
mergers, closure, or bankruptcy.227 This instability can also hinder
advancement and development of technology.228 Such challenges have
caused many providers to incur the cost of a challenging EHR transition
more than once.229 When providers are faced with a second or third
transition, they will typically seek out larger EHR companies to avoid the
same difficulties again.230 Such instability in the market and movement
between systems can potentially exacerbate healthcare industry
vulnerabilities.231
The size of the EHR market and the potential consolidation has also
led to other market challenges, such as an increasing trend toward the
involvement of EHR companies in malpractice lawsuits and other lawsuits
related to patient safety.232 While the number of malpractice lawsuits
remains small at approximately 1%, the frequency has been increasing in
recent years, doubling from 2013 to 2014.233 Many of these lawsuits have
arisen out of errors in patient files that were the result of issues with a
system’s EHR, including “faulty voice-recognition software;
[m]isinterpretation of EHR drop-down menus; [r]eliance on outdated or
incorrect records; and [t]ypos that led to medical errors.”234 According to
226. See Michael McBride, Understanding the True Costs of an EHR Implementation Plan,
MED. ECON. (July 25, 2012), http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-economics/
news/modernmedicine/modern-medicine-feature-articles/understanding-true-costs-ehr-?page=full
(highlighting all of the direct and indirect-and sometimes hidden-costs of implementing a new EHR
system).
227. See Gregg, supra note 225.
228. Id. (“Recently, the EHR market has seen an infusion of providers seeking replacements for
their current systems. Surveys suggest between 12 and 30 percent of providers are dissatisfied with
their EHR. Girish Navani, CEO and co-founder of eClinicalWorks, said in 2013 more than half of his
company’s new clients came from another vendor.”).
229. Id.
230. See id.
231. See Sittig & Singh, supra note 38, at e1044; David W. Bates et al., A Proposal for Electronic
Medical Records in U.S. Primary Care, 10 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 1, 6–7 (2003) (“Another
barrier has been the transience of vendors; many early [electronic medical records (EMR)] developers
are in precarious financial positions or event defunct. Consequently, primary care practices see
implementing EMRs from current vendors as risky.”).
232. In Just One Year, the Number of EHR-Related Lawsuits Doubled, ADVISORY BOARD
(May 6, 2015, 8:41 AM), https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2015/05/06/ehr-lawsuits [https://
perma.cc/2PFC-RAU6] [hereinafter ADVISORY BOARD]; Lisa Schencker, EHR Safety Goes to Court,
MOD. HEALTHCARE (June 25, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160625/
MAGAZINE/306259982 [https://perma.cc/7LKR-S5EC].
233. ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 232.
234. Id.
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Modern Healthcare, “Medical malpractice insurer the Doctors Co. closed
twenty-eight claims in 2013 involving EHRs, and nearly that many during
the first two quarters of 2014. In all, the Doctors Co. closed ninety-seven
claims involving EHRs from January 2007 to June 2014.”235 To the extent
that this trend continues to increase, litigation and legal costs could further
stress the financial stability of the EHR market and many existing
healthcare facilities.
Similar to those issues raised in a malpractice lawsuit, patient safety
has also become a focus, particularly in a case involving a warring
healthcare provider and an EHR vendor.236 In this particular lawsuit, EHRvendor Cerner filed a breach of contract lawsuit against PinnacleHealth
after PinnacleHealth cancelled its twenty-year contract with Siemens
(which was bought by Cerner) and instead entered into a contract with
Siemen’s competitor, Epic Systems Corp.237 PinnacleHealth filed a
counterclaim alleging fraud and breach of contract related to various
patient safety issues that came about as a result of the Cerner EHRsoftware.238 These patient safety issues included challenges in discharging
a patient with the wrong medication, ordering pharmaceuticals not
available to certain patients as a result of the EHR system, and failing to
track patients.239
While malpractice and patient safety claims related to EHRs remain
relatively low, there are nevertheless real concerns to the extent that these
claims have become more widespread. First, individual user error accounts
for the vast majority of the one percent of malpractice claims against
vendors that have already been filed.240 Additionally, even if a plaintiff
could prove that the error was in fact inherent in the structure, design, or
operation of the EHR system, providers are often still taking on the
greatest level of risk because EHR vendors frequently include “hold
harmless” provisions in their contracts that make it difficult for the
provider to seek redress from the vendor.241 Even if such claims are
235. Schencker, supra note 232.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Answer, Amended New Matter, Amended Counterclaim, Third-Party Complaint and Jury
Demand, Cerner Health Servs., Inc. v. Pinnacle Health Sys., No. 15-05453 (C.P., Chester City, Pa.
May 23, 2016).
239. Id. at 65–72.
240. Schencker, supra note 232 (noting that 64% of EHR-related claims in this sample involved
user errors, 42% involved issues with the EHR system itself (some with more than one contributing
factor), 10% involved a failure of system design, and 9% involved an electronic system or technology
failure).
241. Id. Even with this increase in claims against EHRs, many critics argue that EHRs,
nevertheless, make care better and generally improve patient safety as opposed to undermine it. See
also ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 232.
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challenging to prove, the fact that EHR vendors could face increased
liability (and related costs) may create financial issues for certain EHR
companies, which in turn will create difficulties for clients and customers
in the form of increased costs, decreased financial stability of existing
companies, and resulting transitions.
Despite government regulations to combat cyberattacks in the form
of the CFAA and now the CISA, there are nevertheless distinct and
significant challenges to addressing and combatting sophisticated
cyberattacks, especially those affecting patient safety such as malware
attacks. While the CFAA creates an enforcement mechanism for catching
perpetrators of malware attacks and carries substantial penalties,
jurisdictional challenges remain as many attacks occur in locations outside
the United States, and hackers remain elusive with sophisticated methods
of remaining relatively anonymous.242 In contrast, the CISA is intended to
share information among industry professionals to enable them to work
together to prevent attacks from happening, but the voluntary nature of the
program and necessary infrastructure development for the healthcare
sector make it difficult for this law to be any sort of immediate response
or solution to the recent cyberattacks.243 Likewise, changes and shifts in
the industry and some consolidation in the very crowded field of EHR
space have contributed to some past market instability, and it seems as
though this trend may continue over the next few years.244 This lack of
stability along with a trend toward increased liability for EHR vendors
could hold the industry back from moving more rapidly away from
focusing on EHR adoption and more toward promoting greater security in
EHR products.
III. ADDRESSING AND COMBATING CYBER CONCERNS
While HIPAA and HITECH provide an existing structure for
addressing security concerns and although certain updates and changes are
certainly warranted for a now thirteen-year-old law, it would be naïve to
think that simply updating the now-antiquated law can be the only
sufficient solution. Rather, the approach must be multi-faceted and include
not only some changes to existing law—including changes to HIPAA,
242. See Greenemeir, supra note 156.
243. See generally supra notes 211–217.
244. Ross Koppel & Christopher U. Lehmann, Implications of an Emerging EHR Monoculture
for Hospitals and Healthcare Systems, 22 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 465, 466 (Oct. 23, 2014)
(noting that while there is some increased pressure for industry consolidation, existing vendor products
compete greatly, and thus, integration will take years and pressure for competing data standards will
be enhanced by consolidation).
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HITECH and others—but also to the culture and demands of the healthcare
industry. Any changes to existing law must also be accompanied by some
shifts in the industry wherein healthcare providers not only move IT and
IT security to the forefront of their priorities but also demand a better
product from their EHR vendors.245 Additionally, the industry must work
on moving closer to HIPAA’s ultimate goals of interoperability and
communication between EHR systems to reduce some of the
fragmentation that makes healthcare providers such an easy target. The
following subsections will now address each of those proposed solutions
in turn.
A. Amending HIPAA and Other Laws
Leaving existing regulations in their current form cannot be a
solution, and it seems equally clear that while updating the now
thirteen-year-old security regulations under HIPAA may help curb
ransomware attacks and other cyberattacks, that cannot be the singular
solution.246 HIPAA, in its origins, was intended more for the purpose of
improving healthcare outcomes and patient care by creating better
communication and information exchange between providers and
reducing some of the fragmentation that has plagued the U.S. healthcare
system since the late 1970s.247 With this focus in mind, the security
concerns, which emerged in an age of a less sophisticated internet
marketplace, first emphasized preventing public disclosures by the
provider of a patient’s private health information.248 Thus, the regulations
emphasized the actions of the healthcare entity, through its employees,
agents, and business associates, as the most likely disclosing entity.
In contrast, ransomware and related attacks are rarely coming from
authorized users within the HIPAA-covered entity; rather, such access is
being sought by third parties attempting to access the data externally.249
245. See Kevin Lonergan, Why the Healthcare Industry Badly Needs a Cyber Security Health
Check, INFO. AGE (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.information-age.com/why-healthcare-industry-badlyneeds-cyber-security-health-check-123460052/ [https://perma.cc/VJ4H-8J4P] (“Hospitals are often
easier targets for cyber-crime because they lack proper cyber security defenses. Healthcare spending
for cyber security is known to be low, compared to other regulated industries.”).
246. See generally supra notes 66–67.
247. See supra notes 27–29.
248. Many of the early cases in which HIPAA was first utilized are cases that typically involved
state law claims such as breach of confidentiality, breach of contract, or intentional infliction of
emotional distress (as a result of information that was disclosed publicly, causing job loss or loss of
family and friends due to stress or embarrassment). See, e.g., Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Or.,
696 P.2d 527 (Or. 1985); Doe v. Medlantic Health Care Group, Inc., 814 A.2d 939 (2003).
249. See Should HIPAA Be Expanded to Improve Defenses Against Hackers?, HIPAA J.
(Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.hipaajournal.com/hipaa-expanded-improve-defenses-hackers-017/
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Granted, with the initial slow adoption of EHR systems, amending the
security regulations sufficient to maintain pace with the rapid expansion
and evolution of cybercrimes became secondary to simply encouraging
use of EHRs and ensuring providers had time to adjust to the HIPAA
disclosure regulations under the Privacy Rule.250 Now that such EHR
adoption has become more widespread,251 more emphasis needs to be
placed on making sure that the regulations enacted are actually addressing
the current concerns of third parties.252 While many healthcare providers
are in the process of implementing “meaningful use” regulations and new
quality reporting requirements required by various programs under the
ACA,253 hackers’ new methods and approaches are expanding and
evolving at a pace that, unfortunately, cannot provide healthcare providers
with needed time to adjust to new changes.254 Therefore, it is critical that
such amendments have a more aggressive and expansive approach to
addressing threats to security from outside, third-party attackers.
Fortunately, it is not necessary for HHS or lawmakers to develop
amendments anew, as there are already various resources available to the
industry to help providers enhance and expand their security
protections.255 Currently, such guidance is informational only and leaves
the onus on healthcare providers (and perhaps, to some extent, EHR
[https://perma.cc/8TNM-F76D] [hereinafter HIPAA J.] (commenting that one issue with security
regulation under HIPAA is a lack of requirement for data encryption, but noting that in many of the
large scale breaches, the hacker(s) has been able to gain access to a system administrator’s ID and
password, which means that encryption would not have helped because the hacker would thus have
access to encrypted files).
250. See Sittig & Singh, supra note 38.
251. See HENRY ET AL., supra note 32 (noting that more than 96% of hospitals have at least
purchased a certified EHR).
252. There are still some critics who contend that the industry as a whole is still not entirely
ready for any changes, because it is still attempting to implement the “meaningful use” regulations
and adjust to life in an electronic world. See HIPAA J., supra note 249 (“Legislation updates are
unlikely to bring about fast change in the healthcare industry as data privacy and security rules
introduced in 2000 and 2003 are still not universally being followed. Instead of increased legislation,
it is perhaps better to concentrate on enforcing the rules that have already been introduced.”).
253. See generally James R. Horney & Paul N. Van de Water, House-Passed and Senate Health
Bills Reduce Deficit, Slow Health Care Costs, and Include Realistic Medicare Savings, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Dec. 5, 2009), http://www.cbpp.org/research/house-passed-and-senatehealth-bills-reduce-deficit-slow-health-care-costs-and-include
[https://perma.cc/Q6TH-39EZ]
(summarizing various cost control and quality measures under the ACA).
254. See Zetter II, supra note 105.
255. See CROSSWALK, supra note 24, at 1–2 (noting that those who implement best practices
under the guidelines “should not assume that by so doing they are in full compliance with the Security
Rule”); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., POSTMARKET MANAGEMENT OF CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL
DEVICES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (Dec. 28, 2016),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocument
s/UCM482022.pdf [hereinafter FDA POSTMARKET MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE].
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vendors) to impose on themselves measures and methods more exacting
than legally required.256 HHS has worked with the NIST to create a HIPAA
crosswalk to NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework and through the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) to issue guidance on cybersecurity for
medical devices.257 HHS likewise reiterated in its Fact Sheet that, while
the HIPAA privacy and security rules help provide a base for addressing
cybersecurity concerns, HHS encourages providers to undertake their own
protections above and beyond those required.258 These documents provide
advice and information to providers on best practices for cybersecurity—
these practices, at times, make recommendations beyond HIPAA
compliance, thus exposing to providers areas in which they may remain
vulnerable.259 Each of the publications cross-references one another and
recommend the others as alternative sources that could be helpful for
developing a comprehensive cybersecurity program.260 Consistent with
recent efforts set forth under the CISA, the FDA and NIST guidance
recommends participation in some sort of sharing forum in order to
exchange information with other providers about existing threats.261 While
these resources are helpful—as are several other resources available
through HHS, such as the HHS Security Risk Assessment Tool262—the
current approach requires providers to consult various resources and puts

256. See FDA POSTMARKET MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 254, at 8. See generally
Ransomware Fact Sheet, supra note 81.
257. See FDA POSTMARKET MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 255, at 4–5.
258. See Ransomware Fact Sheet, supra note 81, at 2.
259. One of the most common entry points for hackers is through medical devices that are not,
as a singular device, subject to the HIPAA regulations, but which carry PHI and connect to a larger
hospital or health system network through the interconnectivity of the devices to the system. For an
extensive discussion on how specifically to address the risks of medical devices to cybersecurity
generally, see generally Wellington, supra note 144.
260. CROSSWALK, supra note 24, at 2; FDA POSTMARKET MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note
255, at 6–7.
261. CROSSWALK, supra note 24, at 8 (stating that the HIPAA Security Rule does not have a
provision that corresponds to NIST’s framework requirement that “[t]hreat and vulnerability
information is received from information sharing forums and sources,” but noting in a footnote that
the HIPAA Security Rule does require a breach analysis and therefore there is some reporting of
information to the extent a breach is identified and some of this information is thus shared publicly);
see also FDA POSTMARKET MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 255, at 6 (“Critical to the adoption
of proactive, rather than reactive, postmarket cybersecurity approach is the sharing of cyber risk
information and intelligence within the medical device community. This information sharing can
enhance management of individual cybersecurity vulnerabilities and provide advance cyber threat
information to additional relevant stakeholders to manage and enhance cybersecurity in the medical
device community and HPH Sector.”).
262. See Security Risk Assessment, HEALTHIT.GOV, https://www.healthit.gov/providersprofessionals/security-risk-assessment [https://perma.cc/XP2D-2AZM] (tool available for download
from this site).
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the onus on the provider to decide which of the recommendations it should
implement beyond HIPAA-compliance measures.263
While such voluntary options may be helpful for purposes of not
overwhelming or overloading those in the healthcare industry with
additional new obligations when it comes to cybersecurity, it is not
particularly helpful in impressing upon the industry the true necessity for
compliance with known risks.264 It also leaves HIPAA-covered entities,
especially those that are already struggling to make—under meaningful
use requirements—costly investments in EHR systems, with having to
prioritize which security regulations beyond HIPAA may be helpful,
beneficial, or even necessary for ensuring appropriate protection of data.
Incorporating other guidance into the HIPAA Security Rule—including
incorporation of medical devices, data stored and exchanged on medical
devices, and encryption of data—will provide clarity for HIPAA-covered
entities and will ensure that EHR products on the market incorporate
greater security provisions in order to be able to certify the product as
HIPAA-compliant.265
Although the CISA has many critics, it seems that the bill is at least
a step in the right direction toward developing a more comprehensive
approach from the healthcare community about how to address these risks
and how to safely share such data within the confines of HIPAA.266 It is
perhaps true that, in this world of rapidly changing and advancing
technology and cyber threats, the healthcare industry does not have the
luxury to wait a year for recommendations, especially in a reporting
structure that is retrospective in nature.267 Additionally, without any
obligation to report, it is not clear whether, even with recommendations,
the CISA will have achieved its intended benefit.268 It is necessary,
however, to begin somewhere and, prior to making any information
sharing mandatory on healthcare providers, it seems advisable to explore
appropriate processes and determine best practices for how and in what
manner this data can safely be shared without compromising patient
privacy concerns. It will be vital for HHS to act quickly once the task force
has completed its work to implement any recommendations, including
263. HIPAA Security Rule, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., https://www.nist.gov/
healthcare/security/hipaa-security-rule [https://perma.cc/6SK6-K9ZG] (“In the preamble to the
Security Rule, several NIST publications were cited as potentially valuable resources for readers with
specific questions and concerns about IT security.”).
264. See Zetter II, supra note 105.
265. See Snell, supra note 67.
266. One such step might first be the acknowledgement that sharing of healthcare data is unique
and different than other data and thus necessitates a healthcare task force that might adopt a different
approach to data sharing. See generally 6 U.S.C. § 1533 (2015).
267. See Frank, supra note 218.
268. See Rosenfeld, supra note 171.
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promulgation of regulations as needed, if certain changes are deemed
necessary, in order to assure cybersecurity in the healthcare arena.
B. Changes to Industry Operations and Culture
Even if certain legislative changes are made, changes to industry
operations and culture are still needed to fully address the cybersecurity
threats that are affecting the healthcare industry. As has been demonstrated
by the slow adoption of EHRs following HIPAA and the continued
challenges healthcare companies are encountering in trying to implement
HITECH and “meaningful use” regulations,269 the healthcare industry has
not arrived at its transition to an electronic system organically or in
response to patient demand.270 Rather, many healthcare providers have
adopted the use of electronic medical records reluctantly and with great
trepidation, mostly driven by concerns about the expense and the impact
that such use will have on practice and productivity.271 As a result,
adoption and implementation of regulations has been challenging, in spite
of regulations being in place since 2003.272
The emergence and use of technology in healthcare stands in stark
contrast to that of the banking industry, and this might give some clues as
to why cybersecurity is so much more pronounced and established in the
banking industry.273 “Electronic banking”274 first rose to popularity in the
269. See Sittig & Singh, supra note 38.
270. Id.
271. See Dawn Heisey-Grove et al., A National Study of Challenges to Electronic Health Record
Adoption and Meaningful Use, 52 MED. CARE 144, 146–47 (Feb. 2014), http://journals.lww.com/lwwmedicalcare/Documents/13-00342.pdf. Regarding implementation of meaningful use regulations and
associated challenges, the report noted: “Providers in small private practices require assistance along
all steps of the [Security Risk Analysis (“SRA”)] process, as they usually do not have in-house, IT,
vendor or privacy and security expertise. Practice staff typically need education and training on
privacy and security compliance, how to perform the SRA, and how to implement mitigation of issues
identified in the SRA.” Id. at 147.
272. Id. at 144; Brian Schilling, The Federal Government Has Put Billions Into Promoting
Electronic Health Record Use: How Is It Going?, COMMONWEALTH FUND, QUALITY MATTERS
ARCHIVE, June/July 2011, http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/newsletters/qualitymatters/2011/june-july-2011/in-focus [https://perma.cc/CT32-D6GK].
273. Beth Kutscher, Healthcare Underspends on Cybersecurity as Attacks Accelerate, MOD.
HEALTHCARE (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160303/NEWS/
160309922 [https://perma.cc/E6ZW-RH8V] (contrasting spending by healthcare providers on
cybersecurity at less than six percent of budget to financial and banking institutions that spend twelve
to fifteen percent).
274. Technically, there are different forms of electronic banking, including online banking
(customers being able to access their account information online, including features like online bill
pay and transferring of funds between accounts, and through software connected between a personal
computer and the bank’s server), web-based banking (the same concept as online banking, but through
a web-portal through the bank’s central computers), and internet banks, which are banks that only exist
in an electronic world and do not have a physical brick and mortar location. See Kimbrelly Kegler,
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late 1990s when both brick-and-mortar banks275 and new internet-only
banks began offering the same services via the internet.276 Much of this
evolution arose out of consumer demand for banking services that were
more accessible and user friendly and did not require trips to the bank
during banking-only hours.277 Thus, in order to compete with the
introduction of a new competitor—the internet-only bank—brick-andmortar banks had to adapt and provide competing services to their
customers, some of which have involved incentives for the consumer to
use online resources as opposed to paper transactions.278
Once banks began utilizing these online services, they realized the
financial savings that would come along with such shifts to an online
system, which motivated both consumers and banks to make the shift to
an online platform.279 Thus, the move toward electronic banking was
consumer driven, but banks (both brick-and-mortar and internet-only)
soon realized the value of online banking from a cost perspective, and they
were also motivated to continue and expand the practice.280
Once the industry was inspired to move consumers to an online
platform, there was equal incentive to ensure that there was sufficient
security and privacy, not simply for compliance with the Electronic Funds
Transfer Act (EFTA),281 the Right to Financial Privacy Act,282 and the Fair
Credit Reporting Act,283 but because consumers who did not feel their
Electronic Banking: Security, Privacy, and CRA Compliance, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 426, 428–33
(1998).
275. “Brick-and-mortar” is defined as “relating to or being a traditional business serving
customers in a building as contrasted to an online business.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY.
276. See Christian N. Watson, The Growth of Internet-Only Banks: Brick and Mortar Branches
are Feeling the “Byte,” 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 345, 346–47 (2000) (describing the distinctions
between the use by traditional banks of online services and also the emergence of Internet-only banks
in which there is no physical building or branch, but rather just an online presence).
277. Id. at 346 (“Customer demand for access to their bank accounts via the Web led to the
creation of the second type of electronic banking, the true Internet-only bank.”).
278. Id. at 346–48. Part of this push by banks to move individuals to an online banking platform
is because of the reduced cost of this type of service. As noted by Christian Watson, “The new Internet
banks have obvious advantages, such as no branch maintenance, fewer personnel costs, no paper, and
no time and place limitations. . . . Banking via the Internet is markedly cheaper than using other
channels.” Id. at 349.
279. Id. at 349.
280. Id. at 351–52.
281. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693r (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b) (2001) (Electronic Fund Transfers
(Regulation E)). The EFTA sets forth rights and responsibilities of parties to an electronic funds
transfer with a focus on consumer protection, including provisions regarding release of information to
a third party regarding the consumer’s account. 15 U.S.C. § 1693c (2012).
282. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2012). This law prevents financial institutions from disclosing an
individual’s financial information without an authorization, judicial summons, or search warrant.
283. 15 U.S.C. § 1681–1681x (2012). This law prevents institutions from disclosing consumer
report information (which contains financial data) other than under specific circumstances. All three
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information would be secure online would be less inclined to
participate.284 Therefore, the banking industry developed industry
standards and methods for addressing hackers and other cyber risks in
large part to ensure consumers would have faith and trust in an online
banking system and would continue to use it.285
The healthcare market, however, makes it difficult to assume that
EHRs would have a similar trajectory to the banking industry. For
example, unlike the banking industry, the healthcare industry has no clear
“consumer” to drive a similar movement.286 Patients certainly stand to
benefit from the use of EHRs through an ability to have greater interaction
with their provider through email or online portals, greater access to health
information, and less likelihood of duplicative services. But, the entities
that pay for the bulk of those services—insurers and the federal
government through its operation of federal healthcare programs—also
stand to gain through use of EHRs, but for different and perhaps
sometimes opposing reasons to patients.287 Regarding individual patients,
a study conducted in 2009 concluded that
[w]hile only 9 percent of consumers surveyed have an electronic
personal health record [(PHR)], 42 percent are interested in
establishing PHRs connected online to their physicians. Fifty-five
percent want the ability to communicate with their doctor via e-mail
to exchange health information and get answers to questions.
Fifty-seven percent reported they’d be interested in scheduling

of these laws predated development of the Internet or online banking, so, unlike HIPAA, they were
drafted in response to security and privacy concerns in a paper world.
284. Kegler, supra 274, at 437.
285. This was especially critical for Internet-only banks, which relied entirely on consumer trust
of the bank to maintain security and privacy of their financial information in cyberspace.
286. See Bates, supra note 231, at 2 (noting that the federal government, as the largest purchaser
of American health care, should lead the way toward adoption of electronic medical records by
healthcare providers).
287. FURROW, supra note 28, at 11 (“[A]gency relationships, which pervade health markets, are
highly influential in health care transactions. Most people ‘purchase’ health care services with the
assistance of multiple agents—their employers, the plans or insurers chosen by their employers, and,
significantly, the physicians who guide their choices.”); see also id. at 631 (“In understanding the
structure of health insurance, the crucial relationship is between those who deliver medical care and
those who pay for it. Even a passive indemnity insurer stands between the patient and the medical
provider, as a financial intermediary and an underwriter of risk. Today, with risk shifting from insurers
to employers, and with financial intermediaries playing more of an administrative role than in the past,
the trilateral relationship is more complex.”).
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transactions online if their information is protected.288
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Insurers and the federal government, on the other hand, are more
concerned about the benefits for greater efficiency and patient safety, such
as “decision support regarding the cost and selection of drugs, laboratory
tests, and radiographic studies,”289 and reminders and prevention
guidelines for better management of chronic conditions, all of which
should result in lower overall costs for health services.290 There are
multiple consumers and multiple decision makers in the healthcare
industry having differing needs and desires in terms of the benefits of an
EHR. This distinctive demand does not supply providers with a clear
“product” or necessary functions for implementation and development of
an EHR system.
Because of this challenge of identifying and defining the consumer
to whom the healthcare industry is catering, the push toward EHRs came
not from consumer demand and a recognized cost savings, such as in the
banking industry, but rather from federal regulations.291 Recognizing
complications and flaws in the U.S. healthcare system,292 policy experts
(who then advised U.S. Congress) first promoted the idea that improving
the healthcare system would require a “major federal investment in
information technology” because such technology was “essential to
provide better care at lower cost.”293 Thus, unlike banking, EHRs arose
288. Bernie Monegain, Consumer Demand for Healthcare IT ‘Never Stronger,’ Survey Shows,
HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Apr. 14, 2009, 10:06 AM), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/
consumer-demand-healthcare-it-never-stronger-survey-shows [https://perma.cc/VJX3-R79Z].
289. Bates, supra note 231, at 4.
290. See id.
291. See FURROW, supra note 28.
292. Around the time of enactment of HIPAA and during promulgation of its regulations, there
were a number of influential studies that came out highlighting that the expense of the U.S. healthcare
system did not necessarily equate to its effectiveness or outcomes. A 1999 report from the World
Health Organization (WHO) ranked the U.S.’ healthcare system 37th among other developed
countries. Bates, supra note 231, at 2 (citing G.F. Anderson & J.P. Poullier, Health Spending, Access,
and Outcomes: Trends in Industrialized Countries, HEALTH AFFAIRS (May 1999)). Likewise, the
Institute of Medicine issued a report in 2001 titled, Crossing the Quality Chasm, that referred to the
U.S. healthcare system as fundamentally broken. Id. (citing COMMITTEE ON QUALITY OF HEALTH
CARE IN AMERICA, INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY (2001)). While there were some early adopters of EHRs prior to implementation
of HIPAA, much of the healthcare industry struggled to adopt EHRs for a variety of reasons including
high cost, organizational capabilities, etc. See generally Samuel J. Wang et al., A Cost–Benefit
Analysis of Electronic Medical Records in Primary Care, 114 AM. J. MED. 397 (2003); AGENCY FOR
HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, Electronic Medical Record Systems, https://healthit.ahrq.gov/keytopics/electronic-medical-record-systems [https://perma.cc/2QYZ-ZBUC]; sources cited supra notes
26–35.
293. Bates, supra note 231, at 2.
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not out of competitive necessity but out of legal necessity, and therefore,
the accompanying security and privacy approaches were adopted not to
ensure that consumers would continue to use one’s product but merely to
comply with applicable laws.294 This culture has permeated the slow
adoption of EHR use and the lack of willingness to make substantial
investments in health information technology.295
With the use of technology being led through federal regulations, the
consequences likewise are legislative in nature, such as the assessment of
fines and penalties and required public reporting.296 But, unlike the
relatively small fines and penalties that have been levied against providers
for HIPAA violations in the past, ransomware attacks appear to be a
possible catalyst for finally creating a cultural shift in the healthcare
marketplace that will stress the importance of cybersecurity.
Notwithstanding the bitcoin ransom demand, hospitals and other health
systems that experience ransomware attacks suffer genuine financial
consequences.297 As mentioned in the Introduction, the Baltimore-based
MedStar system was forced to cancel many appointments at its outpatient
facilities, and its primary hospital was eventually unable to triage patients
sufficiently, such that it was forced to go on diversion for new patients
arriving in the emergency room.298 The financial consequences of this type
of attack are potentially substantial for a large system like MedStar,299 but
could be even more devastating for a smaller system or singular hospital
that may not have financial capital to withstand this type of attack.300

294. See Kutscher, supra note 273.
295. See id.; Yaraghi, supra note 55.
296. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 160 (2013).
297. John Woodrow Cox, Possible ‘Ransomware’ Attack Still Crippling Some MedStar
Hospitals’ Computers, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/likelyransomware-cyberattack-still-crippling-medstar-health-computers-at-some-hospitals/2016/03/30/
a82c9fa8-f687-11e5-8b23-538270a1ca31_story.html?utm_term=.a28e738225d3 [https://perma.cc/
W5HH-DTQR] (noting that FBI agents investigated 2,453 complaints regarding ransomware attacks
in 2015, costing the target entities an estimated $24.1 million).
298. See Cox, supra note 2.
299. See Dennis Foley, MedStar IT System Mostly Back to Full Operation After Cyber Attack,
WTOP (Apr. 4, 2016, 12:38 PM), http://wtop.com/local/2016/04/medstar-says-system-mostly-backfull-operation/ [https://perma.cc/J2UV-5KE6] (noting that MedStar officials stated that they had not
looked at the financial impact of the attack as of yet).
300. For analysis of potential costs beyond ransomware demand (if paid), see Christiaan Beek,
Healthcare Organizations Must Consider the Financial Impact of Ransomware Attacks,
DARKREADING (Apr. 7, 2016, 2:52 PM), http://www.darkreading.com/partner-perspectives/intel/
healthcare-organizations-must-consider-the-financial-impact-of-ransomware-attacks/a/d-id/1325030
[https://perma.cc/A92V-9RSU] (noting that healthcare organizations have to consider costs of lost or
stolen records, downtime costs (including delays in surgeries, appointments, lab results, etc.), and
incident response and audit/assessment services).
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According to a study by the Ponemon Institute, the potential cost of
a data breach is about $355 per patient record.301 The same study noted
that 45% of all breaches in the study were the result of a malicious or
criminal attack.302 What are not included in this number or in current
calculations are the potential litigation costs that may result from patient
safety incidents.303 To the extent that a hospital or health system is hit with
a ransomware attack and such attack results in an issue affecting patient
safety, such as delayed care, medication errors, surgical delays, etc., it is
possible that patients who are harmed by such errors could file medical
malpractice claims.304 Perhaps with the increased financial and
reputational risks posed by ransomware attacks, the healthcare industry
will receive a much needed nudge toward a cultural shift that begins to
focus on the necessity for cybersecurity. Without this cultural shift
pursuant to which the industry as a whole takes steps toward adopting a
greater emphasis on cybersecurity, it is unlikely that changes in the law
will bring about the necessary modifications.
In order for this movement to take hold, it is necessary for the
healthcare industry to move toward creating its own best practices
regarding cybersecurity. Perhaps the task force formed under the CISA
will be helpful in implementing this process, but the healthcare industry
can ill afford to delay taking necessary steps much longer, as hackers and
ransomware attackers are developing more and more sophisticated tools
and methods.305 Unlike the slow march to adoption and use of EHRs,
which waited for government regulators to impose restrictions and set
standards, providers and insurers instead must move toward
implementation of these best practices through self-regulation and lead the
way for government regulators. Like the banking industry, players in the
healthcare industry must take a proactive step toward assuring
cybersecurity not because regulations require them to do so, but because
the consequences of waiting on regulations to catch up could be potentially
devastating to patients and also the financial well-being of the institutions
themselves.306
Once healthcare providers and other purchasers of EHR systems
begin to demand more from their EHR system than simply HIPAA
compliance, two consequences may affect the EHR vendor market. First,
to the extent that hospitals and health systems, as consumers and
301. PONEMON INSTITUTE, 2016 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY: GLOBAL ANALYSIS 2 (2016),
http://www-01.ibm.com/common/ssi/cgi-bin/ssialias?htmlfid=SEL03094WWEN.
302. Id. at 11.
303. See ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 232.
304. Id.
305. See FBI, supra note 107; Zetter II, supra note 105.
306. See Kegler, supra note 274.

984

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 40:937

purchasers, demand more sophisticated and advanced cybersecurity in
their EHR products—beyond simple compliance with the law—the
vendors will have to provide such enhancements in order to compete in
the market. Second, it is possible that current market consolidation will
continue, as only EHR companies that have sufficient capabilities and
financial resources to add these enhancements will be able to compete in
the marketplace.307 As more consolidation occurs, and hopefully more
interoperability among vendors as is intended to be the eventual result of
HIPAA and HITECH, there can be more information gathering and
sharing about the types and kinds of attacks that are happening and how
such attacks can be prevented. To the extent that there are fewer vendors
in the market and more vendors are able to communicate with one another
in a HIPAA-compliant fashion, many of the concerns raised regarding
security and privacy in connection with the CISA will be eliminated.308
Consolidation will not eliminate ransomware attacks, but it will increase
the capabilities of the EHR vendors to be aware of the type of attacks that
are occurring and what steps or methods have been employed effectively
in order to eliminate or reduce such attacks.
CONCLUSION
As Ryan Witt, vice president and managing director of the healthcare
industry practice at Fortinet,309 stated, “Ransomware will get worse before
it gets better . . . . You don’t want to think of return on investment as it
pertains to criminal activity, but there is a strong [return on investment],
and these attackers are quite sophisticated and know there is money to be
made.”310 Hospitals and health systems are especially vulnerable to these
types of attacks not only because of the critical nature of the services that
hospitals provide, making their inability to function potentially more
devastating, but because of a lack of updated laws that provide sufficient
protection against the cyberattacks and a cultural attitude that has thus far
failed to fully embrace the need for substantial and ongoing investments
in healthcare information technology.311
307. See Bates, supra note 231, at 6.
308. See Joseph Conn, Healthcare Industry Giants Pledge to Ease Interoperability, EHR Use,
MOD. HEALTHCARE (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160229/NEWS/
160229866 [https://perma.cc/Q7XY-QA38].
309. Fortinet is a company that provides network and content security for various institutions,
including the healthcare industry. See About Us, FORTINET, https://www.fortinet.com/corporate/
about-us/about-us.html [https://perma.cc/Z6R3-DXK9].
310. Bill Siwicki, Ransomware Attackers Collect Ransom from Kansas Hospital, Don’t Unlock
all the Data, then Demand More Money, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (May 23, 2016, 2:58 PM),
http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/kansas-hospital-hit-ransomware-pays-then-attackersdemand-second-ransom [https://perma.cc/K8GG-99T8].
311. See Kutscher, supra note 273.
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To the extent that hospitals and health systems are going to survive
and potentially thwart these attacks, not only do regulators need to update
and amend existing laws to bring them up to date with current technology
by incorporating protections that might help guard against these attacks,
but the healthcare industry as a whole needs to shift its focus to create
greater emphasis and energy around the importance of cybersecurity.
Industry leaders need to develop best practices that supply providers and
other healthcare industry participants with necessary tools not just to
comply with laws but also to help actually prevent such attacks. This can
be accomplished in part by also demanding better and more sophisticated
products that incorporate more up-to-date cybersecurity provisions from
EHR vendors. This will not necessarily be easy for healthcare providers,
as it will require more capital investment for software updates and patches
and better control over medical devices and how such devices interact with
the hospital’s larger EHR.312 To the extent that providers become more
demanding and expectant of their EHR products, this could lead to EHR
vendor consolidation, which may in turn enable easier and safer sharing of
necessary data regarding cyberattacks to help combat issues on a more
prospective as opposed to retrospective basis.
While ensuring that there are sufficient laws in place to protect
patients and their personal health information is vital; it is simply not
enough to believe that the healthcare industry can approach these latest
attacks in the same way that they have approached EHR adoption
generally. Hospitals and health systems should heed the advice of
cybersecurity specialists such as Ed Cabrera, vice president for
cybersecurity strategy at Trend Micro, “If these attacks make hospitals
take a hard look at their security and take these threats seriously, in the end
it could be a good thing. . . . This is a risk they can’t ignore anymore.”313

312. See Wellington, supra note 144, at 145–48.
313. Keith Wagstaff, Big Paydays Force Hospitals to Prepare for Ransomware Attacks, NBC
NEWS (Apr. 23, 2016, 6:06 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/big-paydays-forcehospitals-prepare-ransomware-attacks-n557176 [https://perma.cc/7ZTW-G6LV].

